G.R. No. L-77188. March 14, 1988.
CELSO BONGAY, AVELINO QUIBE, and JOSE MADRIDENOS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE CONCHITA J. MARTINEZ, Labor Arbiter Of The Regional Arbitration Branch of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, REGION NO. XI, and GALMAR AGRI-PRODUCTS, INCORPORATED and/or SOLOMON and LEOPOLDO HONG, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims against private respondents. On October 10, 1985, Labor Arbiter Joaquin Tanodra rendered a decision ordering petitioners’ reinstatement with full backwages. Private respondents received a copy of this decision on February 4, 1986, but failed to appeal within the reglementary period, rendering the decision final and executory. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued on August 29, 1986. Private respondents then filed a motion to quash the writ and, subsequently, a belated memorandum of appeal dated October 16, 1986, from the original decision. Simultaneously, they filed an urgent motion to stay execution.
Public respondent Labor Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez, citing Section 2, Rule IX of the old NLRC Rules, issued an order on October 23, 1986, staying the execution and directing the private respondents to post a bond. Petitioners challenged this order via a petition for mandamus and prohibition, arguing the appeal was filed out of time and the stay order constituted grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether public respondent Labor Arbiter gravely abused her discretion in staying the execution of a final and executory decision and in entertaining the private respondents’ belated appeal.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the stay order, and directed the NLRC to dismiss the appeal. The legal logic is anchored on the finality of judgments and the nature of a writ of execution. A decision that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable; it can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct perceived errors. The only ministerial duty left is its execution. The private respondents’ receipt of the decision on February 4, 1986, started the clock for their appeal period, which lapsed without action. Their subsequent motions and appeal, filed months after finality, were mere dilatory tactics to thwart a valid writ. The Labor Arbiter’s authority to stay execution under the cited rule presupposes a timely appeal. Applying it to an indisputably late appeal was a patent grave abuse of discretion, as it deprived the petitioners of the rightful fruits of a final judgment. The Court emphasized that labor laws, while compassionate, cannot countenance procedural maneuvers that unjustly delay justice, as justice delayed is justice denied. The immediate execution of the final decision was therefore ordered.