G.R. No. L-76464 February 29, 1988
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.

FACTS

Adriana Maloto died in 1963. Believing she died intestate, her heirs—Aldina Maloto-Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto—commenced intestate proceedings and executed an extrajudicial settlement, dividing the estate equally, which the court approved in 1964. In 1967, a document purporting to be Adriana’s last will and testament, dated 1940, was discovered. This will bequeathed more substantial shares to Aldina and Constancio and included legacies to other petitioners. The petitioners then filed a motion in the intestate proceeding for its annulment and for allowance of the will, which was denied. Following this Court’s prior advice, a separate probate proceeding was instituted. The trial court denied probate, finding the will had been revoked, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether the will of Adriana Maloto was effectively revoked.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and allowed the will. The legal logic centers on Article 830 of the Civil Code, which provides that a will can be revoked by burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating it with the intention of revoking it (animus revocandi), either by the testator or by another person in the testator’s presence and by her express direction. The appellate court’s finding of revocation was based on circumstantial facts: the will’s absence from the testatrix’s safes, her retrieval of a copy from her lawyer, and her consultation about drafting a new will. The Court held these facts, even collectively, were insufficient to establish animus revocandi. Crucially, there was no conclusive evidence that the document allegedly burned upon the testatrix’s instruction was indeed the will itself. The physical act of destruction alone does not constitute revocation without the concurrent intent to revoke. Furthermore, the finality of the prior intestate proceeding did not bar the separate probate action, as the two proceedings involve different causes of action and jurisdictions; an intestate proceeding assumes no will exists and cannot adjudicate the validity of a subsequently discovered will. The matters raised by respondents regarding disposition and acquisition of properties were deemed extraneous to the probate proceeding and should be addressed after the will is allowed.