GR L 76140; (June, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-76140 June 27, 1988
FILIPINO MERCHANTS’ INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SPOUSES ALFREDO CALAQUIAN AND DEMETRIA CALAQUIAN, respondents.
FACTS
The private respondents, spouses Calaquian, filed a complaint for damages after their son was killed in a vehicular accident. The trial court held the petitioner insurance company jointly and severally liable for P30,000. After the decision became final, a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff levied on the petitioner’s properties, scheduling an auction sale. One day before the sale, the petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment in the trial court, claiming it only learned of the decision from the writ. It also filed a motion to recall the writ.
Dissatisfied with the pace of the trial court’s action on its pleadings, the petitioner, just days later, filed a petition for mandamus with the Intermediate Appellate Court to compel the trial judge to act. The appellate court declined to issue a restraining order. Subsequently, during the pendency of these proceedings, the petitioner issued and delivered a manager’s check for P30,000 to the private respondents, which was accepted and cleared.
ISSUE
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed reversible error in dismissing the petitioner’s mandamus action and refusing to enjoin the execution.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court committed no error. The petition for mandamus was manifestly premature, as the trial court could not reasonably be expected to act on the petition for relief within only a few days. Furthermore, the mandamus action was rendered moot and academic when the trial court subsequently issued an order directing the private respondents to comment on the petition for relief. This constituted the action sought by the mandamus.
The Court also found the petitioner’s reliance on the Vda. de Sayman case misplaced, as that case dealt with the propriety of issuing a writ of execution, not with its implementation during a pending petition for relief. More critically, the supervening event of the petitioner’s payment of the P30,000 judgment debt rendered the entire case moot and academic. The petitioner’s contention of coercion in obtaining the payment raised a factual issue inappropriate for resolution in a special civil action for certiorari, which the petition was later sought to be converted into. Factual questions are for the trial court in the main case. Since the liability had been satisfied, there was no longer a live controversy for the courts to adjudicate. The dismissal of the petition was therefore proper.