GR L 7561; (April, 1955) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-7561; April 30, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLO ISAAC alias JOSE DE JESUS, defendants-appellant.
FACTS
On the morning of January 19, 1955, in Manila, Dr. Licerio Velasquez, owner of a jeepney (license plate AC-2553), entrusted the vehicle to the appellant, Pablo Isaac alias Jose de Jesus. The appellant was recommended by the regular driver who was on vacation. The vehicle was entrusted for a “pasada” (transporting passengers for compensation), with the understanding that the appellant would return it in the evening and pay P10 “in hire.” The appellant never returned the vehicle. After a search, the jeepney was found in a machine shop in Tarlac, where the appellant had left it allegedly for repainting. Upon arrest, the appellant voluntarily signed a statement admitting that although he took the vehicle for a “pasada,” his real intention was to steal it, as he had a prior agreement with a certain Mrs. Juana Lim to steal a jeepney.
ISSUE
Whether the appellant is guilty of qualified theft, considering that the possession of the vehicle was initially obtained with the consent of the owner.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction for qualified theft. The Court held that the appellant’s possession of the jeepney was not juridical possession but merely material or physical possession, as he was effectively an employee or agent of the owner operating a public utility vehicle. Citing U.S. vs. De Vera and section 26 of the Rules and Regulations of the Public Service Commission (which prohibits operators from allowing the use of equipment under a fixed rental basis), the Court ruled that the appellant could not be considered a hirer or lessee. Therefore, juridical possession remained with the owner. The appellant’s act of disposing of the vehicle with intent to gain and without the owner’s consent constituted theft. Furthermore, the Court applied the doctrine that when property is delivered for a specific purpose and the recipient fraudulently intends from the outset to convert it, the subsequent conversion relates back, making the taking larceny (theft). The appellant’s own confession established this fraudulent initial intent.