Kabushi Kaisha Isetan, also known and trading as Isetan Co., Ltd., petitioner, vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, The Director of Patents, and Isetann Department Store, Inc., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Kabushi Kaisha Isetan, a Japanese corporation, is the owner of the trademark “Isetan” and “Young Leaves Design,” first used in 1936 and registered in Japan. It applied for registration of these marks in the Philippines in 1983. Private respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc., a domestic corporation, registered its corporate name and a similar “Isetann and Flower Design” mark in the Philippines in 1980. The petitioner filed petitions with the Philippine Patent Office for the cancellation of the respondent’s certificates of supplemental registration, alleging that the respondent’s mark and name were confusingly similar to its own, intended to cash in on its international goodwill, and violated the Paris Convention.
The Director of Patents dismissed the cancellation petitions. The petitioner received a copy of the order denying its motion for reconsideration of this decision on April 11, 1986. It then filed a notice of appeal with the Intermediate Appellate Court on May 5, 1986.
ISSUE
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court correctly dismissed the petitioner’s appeal for having been filed out of time.
RULING
Yes, the appellate court’s dismissal was correct. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and must be exercised strictly in accordance with the law. The reglementary period for filing an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Under the applicable laws, Republic Act No. 5434 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the petitioner had fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order denying its motion for reconsideration to perfect its appeal.
The petitioner admitted receiving the denial order on April 11, 1986. Its period to appeal thus expired on April 26, 1986. By filing its notice of appeal only on May 5, 1986, it filed twenty-four (24) days after receipt, which was clearly beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Consequently, the decision of the Director of Patents had already become final and executory. The failure to comply with this mandatory period deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The Court affirmed the dismissal without needing to delve into the substantive merits of the trademark dispute, as the jurisdictional defect was fatal.
