G.R. No. L-7518 May 27, 1955
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE MODESTO CASTILLO, JOSE S. BAUTISTA AND V. JANSON, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; and ATOK-BIG WEDGE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, respondents.

FACTS

The Atok-Big Wedge Mutual Benefit Association petitioned the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) to order the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. to pay its laborers and employees a Christmas bonus for 1951 and every year thereafter. The parties initially entered into a written stipulation agreeing to submit the matter on stipulation to the Presiding Judge of the CIR for a final decision, without the benefit of an appeal to the CIR in banc or to the Supreme Court. However, the parties later elected not to submit the case on a stipulation of facts and instead introduced evidence. The Presiding Judge denied the claim for the 1951 Christmas bonus. The respondent Union filed a motion for reconsideration to the CIR in banc, which reversed the Presiding Judge’s order and directed the petitioner to pay the Christmas bonus for 1951 only. The CIR in banc found that the petitioner had admitted to distributing bonuses as an act of grace from 1946 to 1950. Its balance sheets for 1951 showed reserves for bonus provision (P18,000 as of March 31; P36,000 as of June 30; P50,898 as of September 30). The company’s accountant, Pablo Floro, testified that the provision no longer appeared as of December 31, 1951, because the amount of P61,227.63 had been “declared due and payable by the board of directors” and was thus listed under “current liabilities, accrued payroll.” The CIR also noted the company had a net profit of P1,336,190.41 for 1951. The petitioner filed this certiorari proceeding, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the CIR in banc.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Industrial Relations in banc committed a grave abuse of discretion by giving due course to the Union’s motion for reconsideration despite the parties’ stipulation waiving appeal.
2. Whether the CIR in banc committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding that the Christmas bonus for 1951 had been declared due and payable and that the amount was set aside, and in ordering its payment.
3. Whether the CIR in banc committed a grave abuse of discretion in not remanding the case to clarify alleged inconsistencies in the accountant’s testimony and in denying the motion for reconsideration without waiting for the petitioner’s supporting argument.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition.
1. On the first issue, the Court held that the CIR in banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The initial stipulation waiving appeal was an accessory to the principal agreement to submit the case on a stipulation of facts. When the parties elected to introduce evidence instead, they abandoned the principal agreement, thereby extinguishing the accessory waiver of appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be taken away or qualified by party agreement. Any violation of the stipulation would be a matter for appeal, not certiorari.
2. On the second and third issues, the Court, treating the petition as an appeal by certiorari to avoid a procedural technicality, upheld the CIR’s resolution. The findings were based on the petitioner’s own records and the testimony of its accountant, which showed that the bonus for 1951 had been treated as a “current liability” (a definite obligation) rather than a mere “reserve.” This, coupled with the payment of bonuses for five consecutive preceding years and a net profit of over P1.3 million for 1951, brought the case within the rule established in Philippine Education Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, where the CIR could order payment of a bonus already set aside in the interest of justice and equity to prevent industrial disputes. The situation was more compelling here than in the cited case due to the longer period of payment and the company’s accounting treatment of the bonus as a current liability. The promise of a bonus increase by a former superintendent, coupled with the company’s accounting practice, further supported the award.
3. On the fourth issue, the Court found no abuse of discretion. The petitioner had not asked the CIR in banc to remand the case, and the court was not obligated to wait for the petitioner’s argument on its motion for reconsideration. The petitioner had the opportunity to present its arguments before the Supreme Court.