G.R. No. L-750; August 16, 1946
JOAQUIN ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and ISABELO HILARIO, respondents.

FACTS

In Civil Case No. 1307, the Municipal Court of Manila rendered a judgment on January 14, 1946, ordering the defendant, Isabelo Hilario, to vacate the premises located at Nos. 2032, 2032-A, and 2034 Azcarraga Street, Manila, and to pay a monthly rental of P170. The defendant appealed, and the case was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 72180. On May 29, 1946, the petitioner (plaintiff in the ejectment case) filed a motion in the Court of First Instance for the execution of the Municipal Court’s judgment, alleging as ground the defendant’s failure to pay or deposit the rentals for the months of April and May 1946. The defendant was notified of this motion, and on May 31, 1946 (two days after the motion was filed), he deposited the said rentals with the Clerk of Court. On June 11, 1946, after considering the pleadings of both parties, the respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion for execution. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on June 24, which was opposed by the defendant and subsequently denied by the court on July 12, 1946. The petitioner then filed an original petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court, alleging that the orders of June 11 and July 12 were issued in contravention of law and that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to obtain the execution to which he was entitled. He prayed that the Supreme Court order the respondent Judge to issue a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 72180.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion or in contravention of law in denying the petitioner’s motion for execution of the appealed Municipal Court judgment, despite the defendant’s failure to make periodic deposits of rentals during the pendency of the appeal as required by Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus. The Court held that Section 8 of Rule 72 is mandatory. It provides that if the defendant fails to make the periodic payments of rentals (as found due by the municipal court) during the pendency of the appeal, the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the plaintiff and upon proof of such failure, “shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from.” The word “shall” indicates that it is a ministerial duty of the court to order execution upon proof of default. The defendant, Isabelo Hilario, admittedly failed to deposit the rentals for April and May 1946 on time. His deposit on May 31, 1946, was made only after the motion for execution was filed and was therefore late. The Court rejected the applicability of the equitable exception established in Bantug vs. Roxas (73 Phil. 13), as the circumstances in that case (the defendant’s forgetfulness due to his child’s illness and the threat of losing a long-time family home) were special and compelling, invoking the court’s equity jurisdiction under Rule 38. No such special circumstances were present in this case. The Court also distinguished the case from Tolentino vs. Court of First Instance of Manila (75 Phil. 282), as that case involved different procedural postures. The respondent Judge had no discretion to deny the motion for execution once a default in the periodic deposits was proven. Therefore, the Supreme Court directed the respondent Judge to issue the order of execution as prayed for by the petitioner. No costs were awarded.
(Note: The resolution on the motion for reconsideration, dated October 29, 1946, reaffirmed the decision, denying the respondent’s motion and reiterating the mandatory nature of Rule 72, Section 8, and the inapplicability of the Bantug equitable doctrine to the facts of this case.)