G.R. No. L-74975. January 12, 1987.
TOMAS L. BELGADO, as Administratrix of the estate of AMADA T. LAIZ, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FRANCISCO LAIZ, REMEDIOS LAIZ, and LAIZ DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

The Regional Trial Court of General Santos City rendered a decision on September 1, 1984, in favor of petitioner Tomasa Belgado, declaring certain deeds of sale null and void. The dispositive portion also ordered the private respondents (defendants) to deposit with the court all rentals and income from the disputed properties from the date of filing. Private respondents received the decision on September 25, 1984, making their last day to appeal October 10, 1984. They filed a Notice of Appeal on October 2, 1984. Petitioner received the decision on October 1, 1984, making her last day to appeal October 16, 1984.
On October 11, 1984, petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Partial Execution pending appeal, specifically targeting the order for deposit of rentals. The trial court initially denied the motion, believing it lost jurisdiction upon the perfection of private respondents’ appeal. It later reconsidered, not by granting execution pending appeal, but by treating the deposit order as an order for accounting under Rule 39, Section 4, which is not stayed by an appeal, and ordered lessees to deposit rentals.

ISSUE

The core issue is the proper interpretation of Section 23 of the Interim Rules regarding the perfection of an appeal and its effect on a trial court’s jurisdiction to act on a motion for execution pending appeal. Specifically, whether the trial court retained jurisdiction when petitioner filed her motion after private respondents had filed their Notice of Appeal but before the expiration of petitioner’s own period to appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court set aside the Appellate Court’s decision and remanded the case. The Court clarified that Section 23 of the Interim Rules provides that “the perfection of the appeal shall be upon expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.” This means the appeal is deemed perfected only after the expiration of the appeal period of all parties, not just the one who first files a notice.
Here, private respondents’ appeal period ended on October 10, but petitioner’s period ended on October 16. Therefore, the appeal was perfected only on October 16, 1984. Consequently, when petitioner filed her Motion for Immediate Partial Execution on October 11, 1984, the trial court still retained jurisdiction over the case. The Appellate Court erred in ruling that jurisdiction was lost on October 10. The Supreme Court rejected the interpretation that would allow one party to unilaterally divest the trial court of jurisdiction and deprive the adverse party of remedies like a motion for execution pending appeal by merely filing a notice of appeal early. The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination on the merits of petitioner’s motion.