G.R. No. L-74410 May 4, 1988
PABLO MAYOR, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, as Presiding Judge of Branch CXIII of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasay City, and HEIRS OF CARMEN M. ANGELES and EDMUNDO M. ANGELES, represented herein by CLAUDIA F. ANGELES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Pablo Mayor was the defendant in an ejectment case filed by Carmen and Edmundo Angeles. The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in his favor, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed this on appeal. Mayor received the RTC decision on August 29, 1985. On September 13, 1985, the last day of the 15-day period to file a motion for reconsideration, he filed such a motion. The RTC denied the motion, and Mayor received the denial on September 30, 1985. The following day, October 1, 1985, Mayor filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) an urgent motion for a 15-day extension to file a petition for review. The IAC granted the extension “conditioned on the timeliness of the filing of the motion.”
Mayor filed his petition for review on October 16, 1985. However, the IAC subsequently declared the case abandoned and dismissed, stating no petition was filed within the extension period. Upon motion for reconsideration, where Mayor presented proof of filing, the IAC admitted the petition was filed but ruled it was one day late. The IAC computed that since the motion for reconsideration was filed on the last day (September 13), and the denial was received on September 30, the period to appeal ended on September 30. Thus, it concluded the 15-day extension should be counted from September 30, making October 15 the deadline, not October 16.

ISSUE

Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court correctly computed the reglementary period for filing the petition for review, thereby finding it filed out of time.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled the IAC’s computation was erroneous and reinstated the petition. The legal logic hinges on the proper application of the rules for computing legal periods, specifically following the precedent set in Lloren v. Court of Appeals. Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the period to appeal is interrupted by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The key principle is that the day on which the motion for reconsideration is filed (if it is the last day of the period) is excluded from the computation.
Here, Mayor filed his motion for reconsideration on September 13, 1985, which was the 15th and final day of his period to appeal or move for reconsideration. Per Lloren, that day is excluded. Therefore, when he received the denial on September 30, he had one full day remaining to perfect his appeal. Applying the rule that the day of receipt is also excluded, his new deadline to file the petition for review became October 1, 1985. Consequently, his motion for extension filed on October 1 was timely. The 15-day extension granted by the IAC, counted correctly from the day after the original deadline (October 2), expired on October 16, 1985, the very day Mayor filed his petition. The Supreme Court emphasized that an extension period is in addition to the original last day; it does not include that day. Thus, the petition was timely filed.