G.R. No. L-7402 October 27, 1955
Domingo Nicolas, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Ulyses Pre, et al., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

On October 8, 1952, Domingo Nicolas filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac seeking to declare null and void a judgment rendered in Registration Case No. 15 (G.L.R.O. Record No. 199). That judgment declared Ulyses Pre, et al., owners of a 5-hectare parcel of land and ordered its registration in their name. Nicolas alleged the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of prior judgment and failure to state a cause of action, which the court sustained, dismissing the case. Nicolas appealed directly to the Supreme Court, claiming the issues were purely legal.
The antecedent registration case began on November 30, 1946, when Nicolas applied to register a 31-hectare land in Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac. Pre, et al., opposed, claiming ownership of a 5-hectare portion. During the hearing on August 6, 1948, after Nicolas presented his evidence and during the presentation of the oppositors’ evidence, the parties agreed to suspend proceedings for an amicable settlement. Instead of submitting a settlement, Nicolas, through counsel, moved to dismiss the registration proceeding six days later, which the court granted ex-parte. Surprised, the oppositors moved for reconsideration to present their evidence. The motion was granted, and the case was set for reception of the oppositors’ evidence with notice to Nicolas’s attorney. On the set date, neither Nicolas nor his counsel appeared. The court then designated its clerk of court to receive the evidence. After the evidence was taken, the court rendered judgment on January 27, 1950, declaring the oppositors owners in fee simple of the 5-hectare portion. No appeal was taken, and the decision became final on April 7, 1950.
Subsequently, on April 21, 1950, Nicolas filed a petition under Rule 38 to set aside the decision, alleging it was null and void for lack of jurisdiction and violation of sections 31, 36, and 37 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act). The court sustained the opposition to this petition on May 25, 1950. Nicolas appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s order on May 12, 1952. The present case stemmed from this adverse decision.

ISSUE

1. Did the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, acting as a Land Registration Court, have jurisdiction to: (a) enter the order dismissing the registration case upon Nicolas’s ex-parte application, and (b) subsequently, upon the oppositors’ motion for reconsideration, amend the dismissal order to allow the oppositors to continue presenting their evidence without reinstating Nicolas’s application or requiring the oppositors to publish their claim as per section 31 of the Land Registration Law?
2. Did the same court have jurisdiction to render the decision based on: (a) Nicolas’s evidence and part of the oppositors’ evidence presented before the dismissal order, and (b) evidence taken before the clerk of court as the court’s delegate on January 11, 1950, without the clerk giving previous notice to Nicolas and without making a report on the evidence as required by section 36 of the Land Registration Law?

RULING

1. Yes. The court’s actions were valid and in accordance with the Land Registration Act as amended. Appellant’s contention that the court violated section 37 of Act No. 496 by continuing the hearing after dismissing the application without reinstating it or requiring a new application for publication ignores the amendment introduced by Act No. 3621. Prior to this 1929 amendment, an oppositor’s answer could only object to the application and could not seek affirmative relief like registration in their own name. The amendment, reflected in section 37 of Act No. 496, allows an adverse claimant in their answer to seek registration of the land in their name within the same proceeding. The court is empowered to determine conflicting interests and award the land, or any part thereof, to the person entitled. The only condition is that the awarded adverse claimant must pay a proportionate share of the applicant’s expenses, which the trial court ordered. Therefore, the court acted within its jurisdiction in proceeding with the oppositors’ claim after the dismissal of the applicant’s petition.
2. The second issue is barred by the principle of estoppel by judgment, as it was already passed upon by the Court of Appeals in the prior appeal (CA-G.R. No. 7329-R). The Court of Appeals held that the lower court did not violate section 36 of the Land Registration Act when it authorized its clerk to receive the oppositors’ evidence. The Court of Appeals reasoned that section 36 pertains to cases where contesting parties appear and an order of default is entered against those who do not. Here, the situation was different: the applicant (Nicolas) had moved to dismiss his application, and thus, the oppositors effectively assumed the role of applicants for the portion they claimed, without any opposition. Legally, Nicolas had lost his standing in court regarding his application when the oppositors presented their evidence. Furthermore, Nicolas and his counsel, despite notice, chose not to appear at the hearing. Therefore, his challenge to the procedure lacks merit.
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing Nicolas’s complaint, with costs against the appellant.