G.R. No. L-73998 November 14, 1988
PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against respondent Godofredo Isidro. Layugan alleged that on May 15, 1979, while he and a companion were repairing a parked cargo truck along the national highway in Nueva Vizcaya, a truck owned by Isidro and driven by Daniel Serrano recklessly bumped them. As a result, Layugan sustained severe injuries leading to the amputation of his left leg below the knee. The trial court found Isidro vicariously liable for the negligence of his driver and awarded damages to Layugan. Isidro filed a third-party complaint against his insurer, Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation.
The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s decision. It dismissed the complaint, holding that Layugan was guilty of contributory negligence. The appellate court found that the parked truck was improperly stationed, occupying almost half of the right lane just after a curve, and lacked an early warning device. It ruled this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, absolving Isidro’s driver of liability.

ISSUE

Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in reversing the trial court’s finding of liability, specifically in ruling that the negligence of Layugan (or the parked truck’s driver) was the proximate cause of the accident, thereby exempting respondent Isidro from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

RULING

Yes, the appellate court erred. The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s decision, holding Isidro vicariously liable. The legal logic centers on the concepts of proximate cause and contributory negligence. The appellate court incorrectly applied the “last clear chance” doctrine. The evidence established that Isidro’s driver, Serrano, was driving recklessly. The police report and his own admission confirmed he bumped a stationary object. A driver is presumed negligent if he fails to avoid an obstruction plainly visible and stationary on the road. The improper parking may constitute contributory negligence, but it does not sever the causal link between the driver’s reckless operation and the injury. The proximate cause was the driver’s failure to exercise due care to avoid a discernible hazard, not the parked truck’s position. Contributory negligence does not bar recovery but merely mitigates damages. Furthermore, the employer’s liability under Article 2180 for the employee’s acts is primary and direct, not excused by the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The insurer’s liability under the third-party complaint follows the insured’s liability.