G.R. No. L-73698 December 3, 1987
Spouses Juan P. Puertollano and Elena A. Puertollano, petitioners, vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court; Delfin Delavin, Regalado Dableo, Damian Escorel, Alberto Escorel and Jun Almodal, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Juan Puertollano filed an ejectment complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate against the private respondents, alleging they entered and cultivated portions of his grazing land without his consent. The private respondents moved to refer the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), claiming to be bona fide tenants. The RTC granted the motion and issued an order of referral pursuant to Presidential Decrees (PD) Nos. 316 and 1038. Puertollano filed an opposition and later a motion for reconsideration, but subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the referral order.
The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) dismissed the appeal, deeming it premature due to the pending motion for reconsideration and characterizing the referral order as interlocutory. The petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court via certiorari, contesting the prematurity of their appeal, the nature of the order, and the sufficiency of a mere tenancy allegation to justify referral.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) whether the appeal from the referral order was premature; (2) whether said order was interlocutory or final; and (3) whether a mere allegation of tenancy by the defendants is sufficient to compel referral to the MAR under PD 316 and 1038.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled for the petitioners on the first two issues but against them on the third, ultimately dismissing the petition. First, the appeal was not premature. While a motion for reconsideration was initially filed, the subsequent filing of a notice of appeal constituted an abandonment of that motion, making the appeal proper.
Second, the referral order was a final, appealable order, not an interlocutory one. A final order definitively settles a right of the parties, concluding the matter until reversed. The order conclusively determined the issue of referral to the MAR, leaving no further action for the trial court on that point except execution. It therefore finally disposed of the defendants’ right to such a preliminary determination.
Third, a mere allegation of tenancy is sufficient to mandate referral. PD 316 and 1038 require courts to refer ejectment cases involving agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of the landlord-tenant relationship. This referral is compulsory to allow the MAR to make that initial finding; the court itself is precluded from first establishing the relationship. The petitioners’ argument, citing Castro v. Court of Appeals, was misplaced. Castro involved a suit by alleged tenants, not an ejectment case by a landowner, and the trial court there had already made a determination on tenancy. Here, the referral is precisely the mechanism to ascertain the relationship. The petitioners’ claim that the land is grazing land further underscores the need for the MAR’s expert preliminary determination.