GR L 72694; (December, 1987) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-72694 December 1, 1987
AURORA DEL BANCO, et al., petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA, et al., respondents.
FACTS
The case involves a dispute over Cagbalite Island, originally purchased in 1859 by three Pansacola brothers as common property under a co-ownership agreement. This agreement was modified in 1868, specifying the fractional shares of the original co-owners and their successors-in-interest. Over a century later, in 1968, private respondents, claiming to be co-owners, filed an action for partition. Petitioners, some of the defendants and successors-in-interest, opposed the action, asserting defenses including prescription, exclusive ownership, and that a partition had already been effected. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the island had already been partitioned into four parts among the original co-owners or their successors.
ISSUE
Whether an action for partition of the co-owned Cagbalite Island is proper, or whether it is barred by prescription, laches, or a prior partition.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Intermediate Appellate Court’s decision ordering partition. The legal logic is anchored on the imprescriptible nature of an action for partition among co-owners. The Court ruled that no valid partition had ever been formally effected. Mere occupation of specific portions by some heirs, or even the issuance of cadastral titles to portions, does not constitute a legally binding partition. For partition to be effective, there must be a formal subdivision plan and the parties must take actual and exclusive possession of their specific allotted portions, with titles issued accordingly, following the procedure in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Absent this, the state of co-ownership persists.
Furthermore, prescription does not run among co-owners unless there is a clear, unequivocal repudiation of the co-ownership communicated to the others. The possession of a portion by one co-owner is deemed possession for and on behalf of all. The petitioners’ possession and any titling acts did not amount to such a repudiation. Consequently, the right to demand partition, being inherent in co-ownership under Article 494 of the Civil Code, does not prescribe. The action remains viable regardless of the lapse of time, as the co-ownership was never legally terminated. The case was remanded to the trial court to undertake the formal partition proceedings.