G.R. No. L-7142; June 30, 1954
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE LORENZO C. GARLITOS of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and the TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE SOTTO, represented by its executor TAGAKOTTA SOTTO, respondents.

FACTS

Kwong Ah Phoy and Co., Inc. secured an overdraft from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, secured by a mortgage on a property in Cabanatuan. The corporation was later declared insolvent. The Bank foreclosed the mortgage and obtained a judgment on December 5, 1941, in Civil Case No. 8726, ordering the assignees of the insolvent corporation to pay the debt, with the property to be sold at public auction if payment was not made within 90 days. Petitioner Juan T. David acquired the Bank’s rights under this judgment on August 24, 1944. Subsequently, Atty. Vicente Sotto acquired all rights and interests of the insolvent corporation and, by court order dated October 9, 1944, deposited P42,614.83 to pay David’s claim. On November 11, 1944, Sotto’s son, Tagakotta Sotto, attempted to pay David with a cashier’s check for that amount, but David refused the tender. The check was then consigned in court, and Vicente Sotto and the assignees filed Civil Case No. 193-J against David to compel him to accept payment and cancel the mortgage. On August 16, 1945, David filed a petition in the foreclosure case (Civil Case No. 8726) asking for the sale of the mortgaged property. The court, by order dated October 25, 1945, deferred action on this petition until Civil Case No. 193-J was finally decided. The Court of Appeals eventually held the tender and consignation invalid, a decision which the Supreme Court denied review. After this finality, David filed another petition for execution in Civil Case No. 8726 on July 15, 1953. Respondent Judge Lorenzo C. Garlitos denied this petition on the ground that the judgment had prescribed. David then filed this petition for certiorari with mandamus to compel the issuance of the writ of execution.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of the petition for execution on August 16, 1945, and the court’s order deferring action on it, suspended the running of the prescriptive period for enforcing the judgment of December 5, 1941.

RULING

The petition is GRANTED. The order of respondent Judge denying the petition for execution is set aside, and he is directed to issue the corresponding writ of execution. The Court held that the prescriptive period for executing the judgment was suspended. Prescription operates only when there is a right that is enforceable without legal impediment. David’s petition for execution filed on August 16, 1945, and the court’s order of October 25, 1945, deferring action pending the outcome of Civil Case No. 193-J, rendered the enforceability of the judgment conditional and uncertain. The suit filed by Vicente Sotto (Civil Case No. 193-J), which challenged the validity of the tender and consignation meant to satisfy the judgment, created a legal impediment to execution. It was only after the final judgment in Civil Case No. 193-J that the judgment in the foreclosure case regained its final and executory character. Therefore, considering this suspension, David’s petition for execution filed on July 15, 1953, was within the five-year period provided by Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. The doctrine in Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Martinez was qualified by Demetriou and Madrid vs. Lesaca and Chunaco, which recognized that prescription is suspended when the enforceability of a final judgment is suspended by court order or becomes conditional.