G.R. No. L-71381 November 24, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONSTANTINO PECARDAL, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Constantino Pecardal was convicted of robbery with homicide for the killing of taxi driver Rogelio Florendo, whose body was found in his vehicle’s luggage compartment on May 27, 1982. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on an extrajudicial confession allegedly executed by Pecardal, which detailed the crime. This confession was marked as an exhibit during the trial. However, the prosecution failed to formally offer this document into evidence as required by the Rules of Court. Despite this omission, the trial court extensively relied on the contents of this unoffered confession to convict Pecardal and sentence him to life imprisonment.
Pecardal appealed, asserting violations of his constitutional rights. He testified that the confession was extracted through force and intimidation—claiming he was undressed, beaten, kicked, and electrocuted until he signed a pre-prepared statement without counsel. The prosecution did not rebut these allegations of coercion. Furthermore, the record indicated that any interrogation occurred without the assistance of counsel, and any waiver of this right was not made with the assistance of counsel as constitutionally mandated.

ISSUE

Whether the conviction of the accused-appellant, based primarily on an extrajudicial confession that was not formally offered in evidence and allegedly obtained in violation of constitutional rights, should be upheld.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted Pecardal. The legal logic proceeds from two fundamental errors. First, on procedural grounds, the trial court violated Rule 132, Section 35 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that courts shall consider no evidence not formally offered. The purported confession, though marked, was never offered by the prosecution; thus, it was inadmissible and should never have been considered by the judge. The trial court’s reliance on it was a reversible error.
Second, and more critically, even assuming the confession had been properly offered, it was constitutionally infirm and therefore void. Under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was applicable at the time, a person under investigation has the right to counsel, and any waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. The undisputed evidence showed Pecardal was interrogated without the presence of counsel, and his waiver, if any, did not meet this standard. His unrebutted testimony of physical torture and coercion further vitiated any voluntary character of the confession. The Court, citing precedents like People v. Galit, emphasized that confessions obtained under such circumstances are inadmissible.
Absent the invalid confession, the remaining evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution’s case rested essentially on the uncorroborated joint affidavit of two policemen, which was deemed insufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The Court noted Pecardal’s youth—seventeen years old at the time of arrest—making him particularly susceptible to coercion. Consequently, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof, and the accused-appellant must be acquitted.