GR L 7021; (July, 1954) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-7021 July 31, 1954
Joseph Feldman, petitioner, vs. Hon. Demetrio Encarnacion, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Victorio Lachenal, Alfonso Lachenal and Jose Villaflor, respondents.
FACTS
The petitioner, Joseph Feldman, seeks to annul an order issued by the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal on June 30, 1953. This order directed Feldman to deposit with the clerk of court accumulated unpaid rentals plus interest totaling P119,700, and to continue depositing the monthly rental of P1,000 from May 1, 1953, until the appeal of the main case was finally decided. The order arose from Civil Case No. 7799, where judgment was rendered against Feldman (and others) on a counterclaim. The judgment ordered Feldman and his business partners to vacate a shipyard property and to pay the defendants (the respondents here) rentals of P1,000 per month from June 1, 1946, until possession was returned, with legal interest. Feldman appealed this judgment. His record on appeal was approved by the trial court on March 24, 1952, and the case was docketed in the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the respondents filed a supplemental motion in the trial court seeking the deposit of rentals, which the court granted through the contested order. Feldman moved for reconsideration, arguing the trial court lost jurisdiction upon approval of the record on appeal, but this was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent trial court retained jurisdiction to issue the order directing the deposit of accrued and future rentals after it had approved the record on appeal and the case was pending on appeal.
RULING
No. The respondent court lost jurisdiction to issue the contested order. Upon approval of the record on appeal, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over the case, except for matters not involved in the appeal or for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The Court held that the order to deposit rentals involved matters directly litigated in the appeal. Feldman’s assignments of error in his appeal challenged the validity of his waiver of rights over the property, his exercise of a lease option, and his status as a possessor. A reversal based on these errors would affect his liability for rentals. Therefore, ordering the deposit was tantamount to executing the judgment, which the trial court could not do without a special order for good reasons as provided under the rules (Section 2, Rule 39), and no such reasons were stated. The Court annulled and set aside the portion of the order directing the deposit of rentals for lack of jurisdiction. The portion of the order enjoining the disposal of properties on the land was not questioned and was not passed upon.
