G.R. No. L-69854, June 30, 1987
MILAGROS ROSAURO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. MAYOR PABLO CUNETA, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioners, officers and members of the “Pargal Samahang Magkakapitbahay Inc.,” filed a petition for prohibition and injunction. They alleged possession for 10 to 15 years of a parcel of land identified as Lot 12, Cad. 259, Pasay Cadastre, claiming it was patrimonial property of the state based on a Bureau of Lands investigation report. They asserted they had filed an application for its allocation with the Bureau. They contended that respondent Mayor Pablo Cuneta, accompanied by armed men and a demolition squad, partially demolished their houses on the lot without due process and intended to forcibly dispossess them, committing grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Mayor Cuneta, in his comment, asserted he was the rightful owner of the property, having purchased it from the Bombay Merchant Association, Inc., covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3454. He claimed the titled property, Lot 18, was identical to the petitioners’ claimed Lot 12, as certified by Bureau of Lands officials. He denied petitioners’ long-term possession, alleging they were recent squatters who illegally constructed shanties after destroying a perimeter fence. He argued the demolition by the city engineer’s office was lawful under Letter of Instruction No. 19 to prevent illegal construction.

ISSUE

Whether the writs of prohibition and/or injunction should be issued to restrain respondent Mayor from dispossessing the petitioners of the contested property.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and dissolved the previously issued temporary restraining order. The Court clarified that a writ of prohibition is a remedy against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The act complained of—the alleged demolition and threat of dispossession—was not shown to be a judicial or quasi-judicial act performed by the respondent mayor in his official capacity. The core of the dispute was a conflicting claim of ownership and possession over a parcel of land, a matter inherently factual in nature.
For an injunction to issue, the petitioner must establish a clear and positive right that needs judicial protection. The Court found petitioners failed to meet this burden. Their claim rested on a pending application with the Bureau of Lands and an assertion that the lot was patrimonial, while respondent presented a transfer certificate of title and official certifications suggesting the identity of Lot 12 and Lot 18. Given these conflicting factual claims on identity and ownership, the Supreme Court, not being a trier of facts, held that the parties must litigate these issues before the proper courts or await the final resolution of the administrative application with the Bureau of Lands. Since petitioners did not establish a clear legal right to the property, there was no lawful basis to maintain the restraining order or grant the injunctive reliefs sought.