G.R. No. L-68997; April 27, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO LIBAG Y CABADING, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Roberto Libag was convicted by the Regional Trial Court for attempted sale and delivery of marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act. The prosecution evidence, primarily from arresting officers Cpl. Eduardo Garcia and Pfc. Virgilio Visperas, established that a police informer arranged a buy-bust operation. Libag arrived at the designated lodge, delivered a plastic bag containing marijuana flowering tops to the informer, and was immediately arrested. The defense presented a starkly different account. Libag, then a minor, testified he was merely asked by three strangers for a fee of P2.00 to deliver a bag, which he believed contained only pechay (Chinese cabbage) on top, to an unspecified person at the lodge. He claimed no knowledge of the illicit contents.

ISSUE

Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the attempted sale and delivery of marijuana.

RULING

The Supreme Court acquitted Roberto Libag. The legal logic centered on the failure of the prosecution to prove the essential element of mens rea or guilty knowledge. For a conviction under the law, it is imperative to establish that the accused knowingly delivered a prohibited drug. The Court found the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to prove Libag knew the bag contained marijuana. Critical to this conclusion was the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer (the informer) as a witness. His testimony was vital to establish the transaction’s nature and Libag’s awareness. The Court noted the inherent incredibility of the police narrative where the informer, having received the drugs, had no opportunity to even pull out the marked money before the arrest, suggesting the delivery may have been to the wrong person. Furthermore, the prosecution’s story contained unresolved gaps, such as the failure to arrest or investigate Libag’s alleged companion. The defense version, while simple, was not inherently impossible. The Court reiterated the constitutional presumption of innocence and the doctrine that when inculpatory facts are capable of two interpretations—one consistent with innocence and another with guilt—the evidence does not satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own case, not the weakness of the defense. Here, it failed to discharge its burden of proving Libag’s conscious possession and intent to sell the prohibited drug.