GR L 68709; (July, 1985) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-68709 July 19, 1985
NAPOLEON E. SANCIANGCO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JOSE A. ROÑO, Minister, Ministry of Local Government; THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF OZAMIZ CITY; THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. FUENTES, Vice Mayor of Ozamiz City and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City; THE HONORABLE ANTONIO G. CABALLERO, JESUS S. ANONAT, MANUEL T. CORTES, IRENE S. LUANSING, REMEDIOS J. RAMIRO, DOMINADOR B. BORJE, FILOMENO L. ROMERO, FLORENCIO L. GARCIA, and HARRY S. OAMINAL, Members, Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Napoleon E. Sanciangco was elected Barangay Captain and later elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City. By virtue of this latter position, he was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City. On March 27, 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa elections. After losing the election, he sought to resume his duties as a Sanggunian member, invoking Section 13(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, which provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians, or barangay officials shall be considered on forced leave of absence upon filing a certificate of candidacy. The respondent Minister of Local Government ruled that petitioner, being an appointive official, was deemed to have resigned from his appointive position under Section 13(1) of the same law, which states that any person holding a public appointive office shall ipso facto cease in office upon filing a certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE
Whether an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, who filed a certificate of candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa, is considered resigned or merely on forced leave of absence.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner is deemed to have ipso facto ceased from his appointive position. The legal logic hinges on the statutory construction of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697. Section 13 deliberately distinguishes between appointive and elective officials. Subsection (1) applies a blanket rule to “any person holding a public appointive office or position,” causing an automatic cessation from office. In contrast, subsection (2) specifically enumerates elective local officials—governors, mayors, members of sanggunians, barangay officials—who are placed on forced leave. Petitioner’s membership in the Sangguniang Panlungsod was unquestionably appointive, derived from his ABC presidency pursuant to statutory provisions (B.P. Blg. 51 and the Local Government Code). The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that subsection (2) makes no distinction, applying the rule that a statute must be construed as a whole to give effect to its evident purpose. The legislative intent to treat appointive and elective officials differently is clear from the law’s structure and the nature of the enumerated positions. Therefore, as an appointive official, petitioner fell under subsection (1) and effectively resigned. The Court clarified that while he ceased to be an appointive Sanggunian member, he remained the elective Barangay Captain, a position from which he was likely on forced leave, and would require a new presidential appointment to rejoin the Sanggunian. The petition was dismissed for lack
