G.R. No. L-6802 August 26, 1954
JUDGE RAMON R. SAN JOSE of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Manila, THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, and ANTERO PEREZ, petitioners, vs. NATALIO JAVIER and AMANDO JAVIER, respondents.
FACTS
In Civil Case No. 6519, Antero Perez sued Natalio Javier and Amando Javier for specific performance of a contract where the defendants promised to sell him a house on a leased lot with an option to purchase the lot for P1,000. Perez had made an advance payment of P280 and spent P3,247.74 on improvements. The trial court rendered a judgment on February 26, 1952, with a dispositive part ordering the defendants to execute a deed of sale covering the house and the option to purchase the land. However, if they could not include the option and Perez would not agree to the sale without it, the defendants were required to return the P280 and pay P3,247.74, with legal interest from October 20, 1948, plus costs. On October 14, 1952, Judge San Jose issued a writ of execution for the monetary amounts. On October 31, 1952, the defendants executed a deed of sale for the house and their rights over the lot. They then moved to recall the writ, arguing it did not conform to the judgment since the deed was already executed. An affidavit from the Rita Legarda Estate, Inc. revealed the lot had been sold to Fermin Halili on May 27, 1950. Judge San Jose denied the motion and allowed Perez to withdraw his P720 deposit. The defendants filed a certiorari case in the Court of Appeals, which nullified the writ of execution, ruling it amended the final judgment. Perez appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court, through Judge San Jose, acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution for the monetary alternative and allowing the withdrawal of the deposit, after the defendants executed a deed of sale, but where the option to purchase the land could no longer be validly conveyed.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the writ of execution. The terms of the trial court’s judgment were clear: the first alternative (execution of a deed of sale) contemplated a valid conveyance of both the house and the option to purchase the lot. Since the defendants had lost the option (the lot was sold to another in 1950), they could not comply with the first alternative. The execution of a deed selling a right they no longer had was invalid and of no benefit to Perez. Therefore, the second alternative (return of payment and reimbursement for improvements) properly applied. The trial court did not amend the judgment; it enforced its clear terms based on the defendants’ inability to perform the first alternative. The defendants, not having appealed the judgment, were bound by it. The writ of execution and related orders were reinstated.
