GR L 6792; (May, 1954) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-6792; May 14, 1954
FAUSTO D. LAQUIAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FILOMENA SOCCO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS
Fausto D. Laquian, as administrator of the estate of Marcelo Laquian, filed a complaint against Filomena Socco, as administratrix of the estate of Constancia Socco, and the Director of Lands. The complaint contained two causes of action. The first sought a declaration that a house and lot in Manila, registered solely in Constancia Socco’s name, was conjugal property of the deceased spouses Marcelo Laquian and Constancia Socco, and requested its adjudication to their respective heirs. The second cause of action alleged that the deceased spouses were bona fide occupants and tenants of six lots from the Dinalupihan Estate, giving them a preferential right to purchase said lots from the government. The complaint prayed for a declaration that this preferential right was inherited by the heirs of both spouses. The Director of Lands filed a counterclaim for unpaid rents. Defendant Filomena Socco moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing improper venue for the first cause of action and failure to state a cause of action for the second. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE
1. Whether venue was properly laid for the first cause of action concerning the Manila property.
2. Whether the lower court was justified in dismissing the second cause of action concerning the preferential right to purchase the Dinalupihan Estate lots.
RULING
1. No, venue was improperly laid for the first cause of action. Under Section 3, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, actions affecting title to or recovery of real property must be commenced and tried in the province where the property lies. The property is in Manila, but the action was filed in Bataan. The appellant’s argument that it is an action for partition that can be filed where part of the properties are located is untenable, as there is no co-ownership to partition until judicially declared, which is the suit’s very purpose.
2. No, the lower court was not justified in dismissing the second cause of action. The lower court dismissed it on the theory that the administratrix, having a common interest, should have been a co-plaintiff. However, if the defendant’s motion was taken as an admission that the lots were held by both spouses (as it stated she never claimed Constancia Socco was the exclusive tenant), then the court should have granted the relief prayed for in the second cause of action, not dismissed the complaint.
The order of dismissal is affirmed as to the first cause of action but revoked as to the second cause of action. The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings on the second cause of action. Costs are against the appellee.