G.R. No. L-66741 and G.R. No. L-75011, June 16, 1988
ANTHONY SY., ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL., respondents. / TEOVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

These consolidated petitions stem from a dispute over approximately eight hectares of land in Muntinlupa. The property was originally registered in favor of Henry Munar Chan in 1974 (LRC Case No. Q-335). Chan subsequently assigned portions to various parties, including petitioners Anthony Sy, et al., and respondent Philippine Machinery Parts Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Phil. Machinery). Respondent Teoville Development Corporation, claiming ownership through a different title traceable to a 1919 registration, filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 6966-P) to quiet title against Chan and his assignees, alleging overlapping boundaries and seeking to nullify their titles. Phil. Machinery later filed its own quieting title suit (Civil Case No. 9055-P) against Teoville. The cases were jointly tried.
The trial court ruled in favor of Teoville in both cases, declaring the Chan-derived titles null and void. Copies of the 1982 decisions were mailed to the losing parties’ counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, at his address of record. The mailings were returned unserved with a notation that the addressee had moved. No formal notice of change of address had been filed by the counsel. Teoville subsequently moved for execution, arguing the decisions had become final due to the losing parties’ failure to appeal. The trial court granted execution. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the period to appeal commenced from notice to the counsel’s address of record, and the failure to formally notify the court of a new address was at the counsel’s peril.

ISSUE

The main issue is whether formal notice of a counsel’s change of address is indispensable for the trial court’s service of its decision to be effective in tolling the period for appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that formal notice is not indispensable. The legal logic is anchored on due process. The period to appeal is reckoned from receipt of the decision. If the court sends a copy to the counsel’s last known address of record and it is returned unserved, there is no valid service. The running of the period is not triggered. The court cannot presume receipt. The obligation to notify the court of a change of address is a duty of counsel, but the consequence of non-compliance is not the outright loss of the right to appeal. The more severe penalty of forfeiting the appeal is disproportionate and violates the client’s right to due process, especially where the subject involves valuable property rights. The proper remedy for the court, upon failure of service, is to require either the party or the counsel to inform it of the current address. The losing parties were thus not in default, and the orders of execution were issued prematurely.
On the substantive issue of the action’s propriety, the Court clarified that Teoville’s complaint for quieting of title was a proper remedy. The one-year period for review under the Land Registration Act does not apply in cases of double registration, where two certificates of title purport to cover the same land. In such instances, an ordinary civil action to determine who has a better right is sanctioned. The petitions in G.R. No. 66741 were granted, the appellate court’s decision was reversed, and the execution orders were annulled. The period to perfect appeal was to commence anew. The petition in G.R. No. 75011 was denied.