G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners, vs. HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG, ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents.

FACTS

Mario Abong was charged with homicide. After a reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, to which he pleaded not guilty. During the trial, Abong, exploiting the original withdrawn information, deceitfully obtained a bail order from a city court, secured his release, and subsequently escaped. The respondent judge, upon discovering the fraud, cancelled the illegal bail and ordered Abong’s re-arrest, but he remained at large.
The prosecution moved to continue the trial in absentia pursuant to the constitutional provision allowing such proceedings under specific conditions. The respondent judge denied the motion and suspended all proceedings until the accused’s return, prompting the petitioners to seek certiorari and mandamus before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for trial in absentia of the accused who had escaped after arraignment.

RULING

Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the trial court’s order, and directed the continuation of the trial in absentia. The legal logic centers on the proper interpretation of Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution, which permits trial in absentia after arraignment provided the accused has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.
The Court clarified that the respondent judge’s literal reading was misguided. The constitutional provision was enacted to modify the old doctrine in People v. Avanceña, which allowed an escape to indefinitely delay or abandon trial to the fugitive’s advantage. The purpose of the new rule is to prevent an accused from thwarting prosecution by escaping. The requisites for trial in absentia were deemed satisfied in this case. First, Abong had already been arraigned. Second, his escape itself constituted a waiver of his right to be notified of subsequent hearings; he is deemed to have received due notice by placing himself beyond the court’s reach. Third, his failure to appear is patently unjustified, as escape can never be a legal justification.
The Court distinguished this case from Borja v. Mendoza, where trial in absentia was invalid due to lack of prior arraignment. Here, all constitutional conditions were met. The ruling emphasizes that judges must apply the law according to its spirit and intent, not by a constrictive literal reading, to fulfill its objective of expediting criminal dispositions and ensuring that escape operates to the accused’s disadvantage, not as a shield from trial. The trial judge was also directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Abong in securing the illegal bail.