G.R. No. L-66132. June 27, 1988.
DR. FELIX ABAY, SR. AND FELIX ABAY, JR., petitioners, vs. THE HON. FELINO A. GARCIA, ACTING CITY JUDGE, CITY OF BACOLOD (NOW MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT); PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE CITY FISCAL, BACOLOD CITY, RAMIRO GARQUE AND THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Felix Abay, Sr. and Felix Abay, Jr. were charged with direct assault. After arraignment and partial trial, the case was set for continuation of cross-examination of the complainant, Ramiro Garque, on July 1, 1977. On that date, the accused appeared without counsel. The complainant and the private prosecutor also failed to appear on time. Motu proprio, the City Judge verbally ordered the dismissal of the case in open court. The fiscal did not object, and the accused left the courtroom.
Later that same morning, the private prosecutor and the complainant arrived and verbally moved for reconsideration. The judge allowed them to present evidence explaining the tardiness. Subsequently, the judge issued a written order granting the motion for reconsideration, setting aside his earlier verbal dismissal, and resetting the case. The accused moved for reconsideration, invoking double jeopardy, arguing the dismissal was without their express consent. The motion was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court’s act of setting aside its verbal order of dismissal and reinstating the criminal case constitutes a violation of the petitioners’ right against double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy did not attach. The legal logic hinges on the formal requirements for a valid judgment or order of dismissal that constitutes an acquittal. Under Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), a judgment must be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him to be valid. This formal requirement applies to orders of dismissal that have the effect of an acquittal, whether based on the merits or on procedural grounds like the prosecution’s failure to present witnesses.
In this case, the initial order of dismissal was merely dictated verbally in open court. It was never reduced to writing nor signed by the presiding judge. Following the precedent in Cabarroguis vs. San Diego, such an incomplete verbal order does not attain finality as a judgment of acquittal. Since the order was not final, the judge retained the authority to set it aside upon a timely motion for reconsideration, which was filed on the very same day. The subsequent written order reinstating the case was therefore valid and proper. Consequently, the reinstatement did not place the petitioners in double jeopardy, as the first jeopardy had not validly terminated with a final judgment of acquittal. The petition was denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.