GR L 6522; (May, 1954) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-6522; May 24, 1954
LUIS B. UVERO, GREGORIA U. ORIAS, HENRICO M. UVERO, TITA U. DINERO, VIRGINIA U. PORNILLOS, JUVENAL B. UVERO, and ELEUTERIO B. UVERO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIO AZADA, GUILLERMO AZADA, and APRONIANO AZADA, respondents.
FACTS
On September 7, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 1424 in favor of the plaintiffs (predecessors of petitioners) for recovery of real property, ordering the defendants (respondents Azada) to deliver possession and pay damages. The defendants gave notice of appeal on October 3 and filed their record on appeal on October 10. Pending approval of the record on appeal, the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate execution, which the court granted in an order dated October 15, received by defendants on October 18. The order authorized the issuance of a writ of execution upon the plaintiffs’ filing of a P2,000 bond, but stated the execution could be suspended if defendants filed a supersedeas bond in the same amount. The writ was issued on October 30 and served on the defendants on November 6. On November 7, the defendants filed an urgent motion to dissolve the writ, stating they had filed a supersedeas bond on November 6. By that time, the trial court had already lost jurisdiction over the case because the appeal was perfected on November 3 with the approval of the record on appeal and appeal bond. The trial court denied the motion, ruling it had no authority to dissolve an execution already served. The defendants then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court and ordered the execution dissolved. The plaintiffs appealed this order to the Supreme Court via certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court, after having lost jurisdiction due to the perfection of the appeal, retained the authority to grant the defendants’ motion to dissolve the writ of execution.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had no more authority to grant the motion to dissolve the writ of execution after the appeal was perfected. The perfection of the appeal on November 3 transferred jurisdiction over the case to the appellate court and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the judgment, including the power to modify or revoke an order of execution. While Section 9 of Rule 41 allows a trial court, notwithstanding an appeal, to issue orders for the protection and preservation of rights not involved in the appeal, the execution of a judgment is a proceeding affecting the very rights which are the subject of the appeal and is not for protective or preservative purposes. The Court cited Vda. de Syquia vs. Judge of First Instance and Burke vs. Devera to support the principle that a trial court cannot modify or revoke an order of execution after an appeal is perfected. The Court also found that the defendants had sufficient time (19 days from receipt of the execution order to service of the writ) to file a supersedeas bond but did so only after the writ was served. Consequently, the order of the Court of Appeals requiring the trial judge to dissolve the execution was illegal and improper, as the trial judge no longer had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court revoked the order of the Court of Appeals.
