GR L 65192; (April, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-65192 April 27, 1988
RODOLFO DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. Hon. FELIX L. MOYA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Davao, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine Constabulary, was charged with homicide before the Court of First Instance of Davao for shooting Eusebio Cabilto. The incident occurred on February 23, 1979, when Dela Cruz, pursuant to a mission order, was part of a team dispatched to apprehend individuals engaged in illegal cockfighting. After the initial operation, the operators, including Cabilto, followed the soldiers. A confrontation ensued on the highway, during which Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.
While the criminal case was pending trial, Dela Cruz filed a motion to transfer the case to military authorities, invoking Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822 and 1822-A, which vested courts-martial with jurisdiction over duty-related offenses committed by military personnel. The trial court denied his motion, prompting Dela Cruz to file the present petition for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE
Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to try the homicide case against petitioner Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a military member, for an act committed in the purported performance of his official duty.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the civil court lacked jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time the action is commenced. The information was filed on August 2, 1979. At that time, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977, was in effect. It provided that military tribunals exercised exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by military personnel “while in the performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty.”
The Court held that the undisputed facts demonstrated the act was duty-connected. Dela Cruz was a PC member acting under a specific mission order to apprehend illegal cockfighting operators. The shooting occurred during a confrontation stemming from that operation. The proviso in General Order No. 59 regarding a conclusive certificate from the Secretary of National Defense did not preclude the court from making its own factual determination on whether the offense was duty-related, nor was such a certificate a jurisdictional prerequisite. Since the act arose from the performance of official duty, exclusive jurisdiction vested in the military tribunals under the law applicable when the case was filed. Consequently, the proceedings in the civil court were null and void. The Court directed that the case be referred to the proper military authorities.