G.R. No. L-6512 and G.R. No. L-6540; June 19, 1953.
Case Parties:

G.R. No. L-6512: JOSE D. VILLENA, petitioner, vs. HON. MARCIANO ROQUE, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-6540: THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MAKATI, RIZAL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

In G.R. No. L-6512, Jose D. Villena, the Municipal Mayor of Makati, Rizal, was charged with falsification of a public document, convicted by the Court of First Instance on January 9, 1953, and sentenced to imprisonment. Prior to this, on October 29, 1952, administrative charges based on the same falsification, along with other charges (engaging in the practice of law without permission and extortion), were filed with the Office of the President. The charges were referred to the Provincial Governor of Rizal. The Governor suspended Villena on December 17, 1952, but reinstated him after thirty days on January 16, 1953, as no investigation by the Provincial Board had been conducted. On February 9, 1953, the Acting Executive Secretary, Marciano Roque, by authority of the President, informed Villena that the President was taking over the investigation directly, designating the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal as special investigator, and suspending Villena from office effective immediately until the termination of the administrative proceedings. Villena petitioned the Supreme Court to order the Fiscal to desist from the investigation and to declare his suspension null and void.
In G.R. No. L-6540, when Mayor Villena was suspended by the President, Vice-Mayor Bernardo Umali should have automatically assumed the office. However, Umali and Councilor Abundio Suck had been suspended by the Municipal Council on November 16, 1952, under Section 2223 of the Revised Administrative Code for alleged “disorderly conduct.” This conduct consisted of objecting to and protesting against the council minutes that ratified a contract entered into by Mayor Villena involving the falsified document. The Provincial Governor appointed Councilor Ignacio Babasa as acting Mayor. The Office of the President ordered the reinstatement of Umali and Suck, but this order was ignored. Umali and Suck filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which granted a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipal Council and Babasa. The Council and Babasa then petitioned the Supreme Court to review this order.

ISSUE

The primary issue in G.R. No. L-6512 is whether the President of the Philippines has the authority to directly investigate and suspend a municipal mayor for administrative charges, concurrently with or superseding the authority of the provincial governor and provincial board under Sections 2188-2190 of the Revised Administrative Code.

RULING

The Supreme Court, through Justice Jugo, ruled that the President has the authority to investigate and suspend a municipal mayor. The Court held that the power of the provincial governor under Section 2188 is not exclusive. Citing the precedent in Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil. 451), the Court stated that the Secretary of the Interior (and by extension, the President) has “exclusive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other political subdivisions” under Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code. This supervisory power is an active power that implies the authority to inquire into facts and conditions, including ordering investigations and appointing special investigators. The Court distinguished the case from Lacson vs. Roque (92 Phil. 456) because: (1) Villena had already been convicted (not merely indicted); (2) the charge of falsification of a public document was directly related to his official duties (unlike libel in Lacson); and (3) the investigation order specifically required that Villena be given notice and full opportunity to defend himself. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that since the President (formerly the Governor-General) has the power under Section 2078 to suspend and remove provincial officers after investigation, it stands to reason he has the same power over municipal officers. Therefore, the President’s order for investigation and suspension was valid.
In G.R. No. L-6540, the Court ruled that the suspension of Vice-Mayor Umali and Councilor Suck by the Municipal Council for “disorderly conduct” was invalid. Their act of objecting and protesting against the council’s minutes was a legitimate exercise of their duty and did not constitute disorderly conduct. The Court of First Instance correctly issued the writ of preliminary injunction. The petitions in G.R. No. L-6540 were dismissed.
A dissenting opinion by Justice Pablo argued that Sections 2188-2190 specifically govern the investigation and suspension of municipal officials, providing procedural safeguards like a 30-day limit on preventive suspension. He contended that the President’s general supervisory power under Section 86 should not override these specific provisions. He viewed the provincial board’s authority as exclusive once it had taken jurisdiction, and that the President’s intervention after the governor had already acted and reinstated Villena was improper.