GR L 651; (April, 1947) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-651; April 30, 1947
EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante-apelado, vs. REYNALDO RAMOS Y LINAO, acusado-apelante.
FACTS
The accused, Reynaldo Ramos y Linao, was charged with the illegal possession of carbine No. 6718851, caliber .30, with six bullets. He pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced him to six months of imprisonment and costs. The accused appealed the decision. The sole ground for his appeal is that his plea of guilty constitutes a mitigating circumstance, and therefore, the trial court should have sentenced him only to a fine not exceeding P1,000.
ISSUE
Whether the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty under the Revised Penal Code can be applied to reduce the penalty for an offense punishable under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 .
RULING
The Supreme Court DENIED the appeal and AFFIRMED the trial court’s decision.
The penalty for the violation of the relevant provision (Article 878, as amended) under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 , is clearly stated as “prison not exceeding one year, or prison not exceeding such period and a fine not exceeding P1,000, at the discretion of the court.” The law is clear: the court may impose (1) imprisonment only, or (2) imprisonment and a fine. It does not provide for a fine only.
The general provisions of the Revised Penal Code regarding the graduation of penalties according to aggravating or mitigating circumstances are not applicable to laws of the Philippine Commission (and by extension, to special laws like the Revised Administrative Code, unless expressly provided). Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code states that the Code is supplementary to special laws, “unless the latter should especially provide the contrary.” The Court held that when the special law expressly grants the court discretion in applying the prescribed penalty, there is nothing lacking to be supplemented. The discretion granted by the Administrative Code takes the place of the “Rules for the application of penalties” in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the rules on mitigating circumstances from the Revised Penal Code should not be applied to offenses penalized by the Revised Administrative Code and other Commonwealth and Republic laws, as they “obey different systems of legislation.”
The trial court, in imposing six months of imprisonment, did not abuse the discretion granted by law; it acted within the prescribed limits. For the Supreme Court to reduce or increase the penalty would be an undue intrusion into the exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion, effectively turning the Supreme Court into a sentencing body instead of a court of cassation.
SEPARATE OPINION (DISSENTING):
Justice Perfecto dissented. He argued that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code explicitly provides that the Code is supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide otherwise. Since the Revised Administrative Code does not forbid such supplementation, the general provisions of the Revised Penal Code, including those on mitigating circumstances like a voluntary plea of guilty, should be applied. He believed the appellant was entitled to a reduced penalty. Considering the mitigating circumstance and the historical context of widespread firearm distribution after liberation, he would have reduced the penalty to only one month of imprisonment.
