G.R. No. L-6428; August 31, 1954
Testate Estate of the Deceased Tomasa Dayo. Patricio Dayo and Hipolito Dayo, petitioners-appellants, vs. Filemon, Agapita, Candido, Amado, Julio, Laura, Crispina, Felix, Adriano, Hipolito, Cornelio, Tomas, Gregoria, Castor, Rita, Teofila, Gregorio, Silvino, Felicidad, Quiterio, Irene, and Emilio, all surnamed Dayo, Cornelia Villaverde, Maria Jardin, Asuncion Villaverde, Rufino Villaverde, Sabina Talabong, Lucas Gagan, Diego Seno, and Sofia de Asis, oppositors-appellees.

FACTS

A petition for the probate of the will of the deceased Tomasa Dayo was filed on May 28, 1947. The hearing began on June 24, 1947, where the will was presented and two attesting witnesses testified. The deposition of the third attesting witness was taken on January 3, 1948, and certified to the court in May 1948. The case experienced multiple postponements in 1949, primarily at the instance of the oppositors’ counsel. On December 21, 1949, the date set for continuation of the hearing, the petitioners were present in court but their counsel, Atty. Salazar, was absent. Atty. Salazar filed a motion for postponement, supported by a medical certificate stating he was suffering from rheumatoid arthritis and should avoid travel or strenuous activity. The trial court denied the motion and dismissed the petition for probate with prejudice. A motion for reconsideration was filed and denied. The petitioners appealed, contending the dismissal was unjustified.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for probate due to the absence of petitioners’ counsel during a scheduled hearing.

RULING

Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the case for further proceedings. The Court held that: (1) Special proceedings, like probate, are not ordinary contentious suits and dismissals should be ordered only in extreme cases where it is the only remedy consistent with equity and justice. Every opportunity should be afforded to have a decedent’s will admitted to probate. (2) Even under Section 3, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court (on dismissal for failure to prosecute), the dismissal was not justified. The petitioners themselves were present in court; only their lawyer was absent. The rule does not provide for dismissal on the ground of counsel’s absence. There was no failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, as the delays were mostly caused by the oppositors. (3) The trial court’s apparent conclusion that petitioners’ counsel acted in bad faith by misrepresenting his illness was not justified, as the medical certificate supported his claim that he was unfit to travel. The court should have granted the petitioners time to secure new counsel to formally present the remaining evidence.