GR L 6422; (August, 1954) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-6422; August 25, 1954
CRISANTO DE BORJA, petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, SEVERO ABELLERA, Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, RICARDO L. CASTELO, Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija, MARCELA, JUAN, SATURNINA, EUFRACIA, JACOBA AND OLIMPIA, all surnamed DE BORJA, respondents.
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari against an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal directing the execution of a judgment for P83,337.31, entered in the intestate proceedings of Marcelo de Borja (Special Proceedings No. R-2414), in favor of oppositors (the respondent De Borja siblings) and against petitioner Crisanto de Borja, the administrator of the intestate. The order for immediate execution cited two special reasons: (a) the absence of a bond to stay execution as per Rule 39, Section 2, because the administrator’s existing bond of P20,000 could not answer for the judgment; and (b) the petitioner’s alleged fraud and maladministration in managing the estate. The petitioner argues that the property levied upon is his still undetermined share in the inheritance valued at P114,000, and its sale on execution would cause irreparable damage, as execution sales do not yield true value, and the judgment creditors have not posted a bond to answer for damages if the judgment is later reversed.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent court abused its discretion in granting immediate execution of the judgment against the estate administrator.
RULING
Yes, the respondent court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and annulled the order for immediate execution. The Court held that the right to execution arises upon entry of judgment after it becomes final, and execution before finality is granted only for special reasons at the court’s discretion. The reasons given by the lower court were insufficient: (1) The absence of a bond to stay execution is not a special ground for granting immediate execution; a bond is required to stay an execution already granted for special reasons, not the reason itself. (2) Fraud in contracting an obligation is not, by itself, a ground for immediate execution, as the rules provide a different remedy like attachment. Furthermore, the property levied is the petitioner’s undetermined share in an inheritance under judicial administration and the probate court’s control. The alleged reasons do not clearly outweigh the probable irreparable damage from immediate execution. Costs were awarded against the respondent De Borja siblings.
