G.R. No. L-63225; April 3, 1990
ELEAZAR V. ADLAWAN, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO P. TOMOL, as Presiding Judge of Branch XI of RTC-Cebu (formerly Branch XI, CFI-Cebu), Branch XXVII of RTC-Cebu, with Station in Lapu-Lapu City (formerly Branch XVI, CFI-Cebu, Presided over by former Judge Ceferino E. Dulay), and ABOITIZ COMPANY, INC., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Eleazar Adlawan, a contractor, obtained financial assistance from private respondent Aboitiz and Company, Inc. for government projects. Upon Adlawan’s alleged failure to pay, Aboitiz filed a collection suit with an ex-parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. The court granted the writ, leading to the seizure of Adlawan’s properties in Davao City. Adlawan moved to set aside the writ. Respondent Judge Tomol, finding the attachment improperly issued on bare allegations of fraud, issued an Order dated July 6, 1982, dissolving the writ and ordering the release of the attached properties.
However, upon Aboitiz’s urgent motion, Judge Tomol stayed his own dissolution order on July 7, 1982, purportedly to allow Aboitiz to elevate the matter. Subsequently, before Adlawan could file an answer, Aboitiz filed a Notice of Dismissal of its complaint on July 13, 1982. Judge Tomol confirmed the dismissal on July 15, 1982, declaring all prior orders, including the one dissolving the attachment, functus officio and moot. This left Adlawan’s properties in the custody of Aboitiz. Adlawan’s subsequent motions to compel the sheriff to implement the dissolution order and return his properties were denied by the respondent judges.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judges committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motions for the return of his properties after the dismissal of the main case, despite the prior dissolution of the writ of preliminary attachment.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of a preliminary attachment and the effect of a voluntary dismissal. A preliminary attachment is merely an ancillary remedy; its validity is dependent on the main action. When Aboitiz voluntarily dismissed its complaint under Rule 17, it effectively withdrew the very foundation for the ancillary writ. Consequently, the attachment automatically ceased to have any legal basis and should have been discharged.
The Court held that the July 6, 1982 Order dissolving the writ was a final order on that ancillary matter. The subsequent voluntary dismissal did not render this dissolution order moot or functus officio. On the contrary, the dismissal reinforced the imperative to return the properties, as there was no longer any principal action to support the provisional seizure. The respondent judges’ refusal to order the implementation of the dissolution and the return of the properties, based on the erroneous conclusion that the dismissal mooted all prior incidents, constituted a grave abuse of discretion—a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The properties, having been seized under a voided ancillary process in a now-terminated case, must be restored to the petitioner.