G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983
JOSE “PEPITO” TIMONER, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose Timoner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two policemen and six laborers, proceeded to fence off several stalls along the Maharlika highway on the night of December 13, 1971. Among the structures barricaded was the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness. This action was taken upon the recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer, who had cited the establishments for non-compliance with health and sanitation requirements. Dayaon was subsequently unable to reopen his business.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of grave coercion by the Municipal Court of Daet, a conviction affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. The trial court found him guilty as a principal by inducement, while acquitting the two policemen. Petitioner now seeks review, contending his acts constituted a lawful abatement of a public nuisance.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner, in ordering the closure and barricading of the complainant’s barbershop, committed the crime of grave coercion, or whether his actions were a lawful exercise of authority in abating a public nuisance.

RULING

The Supreme Court acquitted petitioner, ruling that his actions constituted a lawful abatement of a public nuisance and thus lacked the element of acting “without authority of law” necessary for grave coercion. The Court established that the barbershop, which encroached upon the sidewalk of the main public highway and had been officially recommended for closure due to health violations, indisputably constituted a public nuisance as defined under Articles 694 and 695 of the Civil Code. This status was later judicially confirmed by the Court of First Instance in a separate civil case, which declared the structure a nuisance per se.
Crucially, the Court emphasized that Article 699 of the Civil Code expressly provides three remedies against a public nuisance, one of which is “abatement, without judicial proceedings.” As the municipal mayor, petitioner was acting to implement the health officer’s recommendation and abate a condition injurious to public health and safety. Therefore, he acted under color of lawful authority and in good faith in the performance of his official duty. For grave coercion to exist, the restraint must be effected without authority of law. Since this third essential element was absent, petitioner incurred no criminal liability. The decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside.