G.R. No. L-61643, September 29, 1983
LUZVIMINDA V. LIPATA, Petitioner, v. JUDGE EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V (Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 84), JOCELYN O. AGCAOILI and JOSE J. AGCAOILI, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Luzviminda V. Lipata was a judgment debtor in a civil case for ejectment and damages decided against her and in favor of the private respondent spouses, the Agcaoilis. The decision, which became final and executory after Lipata’s appeal was dismissed for tardiness, ordered her to deliver possession of a house in Pandacan, Manila, and to pay rentals and damages. An alias writ of execution was issued to enforce this judgment. According to a deputy sheriff’s return, Lipata failed to obey the writ by not vacating the property. Consequently, the Agcaoilis filed an unverified motion to cite Lipata for contempt. Respondent Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan granted the motion in an order dated August 2, 1982, adjudging Lipata in contempt of court for disobeying the writ. She was sentenced to confinement in the Quezon City jail until she complied with the decision. Lipata was arrested and jailed. She then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the contempt order.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner Luzviminda V. Lipata in contempt of court for her alleged disobedience of an alias writ of execution.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the contempt order was void and issued with grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the proper procedure for enforcing judgments for the delivery of real property under the Rules of Court. The Court emphasized that a writ of execution is an order addressed to the sheriff, not to the judgment debtor. It is the sheriff’s ministerial duty, as provided under Rule 39, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, to enforce the writ by delivering possession of the property to the prevailing party. The disobedience of a writ of execution by a judgment debtor does not constitute contempt of court because the writ is not a direct order to the debtor. The Court cited the established doctrine from U.S. v. Ramayrat and subsequent cases, which uniformly hold that a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobeying a court order not addressed to him. The power to punish for contempt is to be used sparingly, on the preservative and corrective principle, and only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey a direct order. Here, there was no such direct order to Lipata from the court; the writ was directed to the sheriff. Therefore, the proper remedy for the Agcaoilis was to compel the sheriff to perform his duty, not to seek the imprisonment of the judgment debtor for contempt. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the contempt order and made the temporary restraining order permanent.