GR L 61323; (June, 1984) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-61323-24 June 29, 1984
RICHARD C. HOEY, petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF RIZAL, and THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Richard C. Hoey filed complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Check Law) against officers of Manotoc Securities. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal found probable cause and filed corresponding Informations in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The accused, Raul Leveriza, Jr., filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Fiscal’s office. Following a reinvestigation, the Fiscal concluded the checks in question were “guarantee checks” not covered by BP 22 and filed Motions to Dismiss the Informations in court, arguing they did not charge an offense.
Petitioner Hoey opposed the Motions to Dismiss before the trial court. He alleged the accused, as corporate officers, diverted public investor funds and issued the dishonored checks as part of a scheme. Before the lower court could rule on the dismissal motions, Hoey filed the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition. He sought to compel the Provincial Fiscal to prosecute the cases and to desist from pursuing the Motions to Dismiss, thereby preventing dismissal and ensuring continuation of trial.
ISSUE
Whether a writ of mandamus may issue to compel the Provincial Fiscal to prosecute the criminal cases and withdraw his Motions to Dismiss filed in court.
RULING
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition. The legal logic is anchored on the jurisdiction of the court and the proper stage for challenging prosecutorial discretion. Under Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the fiscal has discretion on whether to institute a criminal charge. However, once an Information is filed in court, jurisdiction over the case vests in that court. The court’s jurisdiction continues until final disposition.
Here, the Informations had already been filed; thus, jurisdiction properly resided with the trial court. Consequently, the Provincial Fiscal lost control over the cases. The pending Motions to Dismiss were correctly addressed to the court’s sound discretion. The proper recourse for the petitioner was not a collateral mandamus action against the fiscal, but to fully oppose the motions before the trial court, which has the duty to resolve them on their merits. The Court emphasized that the trial court should dispose of the cases, including the motions, “one way or the other.” The petition was premature as it sought to bypass the trial court’s authority to rule on the motions pending before it.