G.R. No. L-60613-20 August 29, 1986
ROLANDO MANGUBAT, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s Decision dated April 20, 1985, which declined to nullify a Sandiganbayan resolution ordering the discharge of accused Delia Preagido to be utilized as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The prosecution moved to discharge Preagido and two others. Petitioners opposed Preagido’s discharge, arguing she had been previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 126 counts of estafa through falsification, crimes involving moral turpitude, though her appeal was pending before the Supreme Court. The Sandiganbayan, in its March 5, 1982 Order, overruled the opposition, holding that the constitutional presumption of innocence prevailed until a final conviction was promulgated. Preagido subsequently gave direct testimony as a state witness.
It was later clarified that at the time of her discharge, the precise status of Preagido’s appeal was not fully known to the Sandiganbayan. Her appeal was ultimately denied with finality by the Supreme Court on November 12, 1985, months after the Court’s 1985 Decision in this case. Petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration, argued that Preagido was disqualified from being a state witness due to her conviction for crimes of moral turpitude, which they claimed rendered her untrustworthy.

ISSUE

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in discharging Delia Preagido as a state witness despite her prior conviction for crimes involving moral turpitude, given that her appeal was pending at the time of the discharge order.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration. The Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered Preagido’s discharge on March 5, 1982. At that time, her appeal from the convictions was pending and not yet finally decided; thus, the constitutional presumption of innocence rightly applied. The ruling was legally sound and not whimsical.
Furthermore, the act of discharge could no longer be undone. Preagido’s discharge as a state witness, coupled with her testimony for the prosecution, operated as an acquittal for the offenses in the cases from which she was discharged. This acquittal precluded her reinclusion as an accused for those same offenses, pursuant to settled law under Section 11, Rule 119. Even assuming the discharge was an error, it was not reversible error affecting the case’s outcome. The error, if any, did not render Preagido incompetent as a witness or her testimony wholly inadmissible; it merely indicated a need for caution in assessing her credibility. Her testimony remained subject to cross-examination and the same standards of proof as any other witness. The defense retained full prerogative to challenge her credibility and contradict her declarations.