GR L 60323; (April, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-60323; April 17, 1990
MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., QUEZON CITY, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
FACTS
The petitioners, homeowners of the Magdalena Rolling Hills subdivision, filed a case against Magdalena Estate, Inc. (MEI) and Quezon City. They sought to recover a portion of Lot 15, Block 18, which was originally designated as an “open space” or park. The Quezon City Council had approved an amended subdivision plan that substituted this original open space with other lots and authorized its disposition. MEI subsequently subdivided and sold portions of this lot, including a conveyance to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) by way of dacion en pago. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioners caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the titles of the lots within Block 12, which were among those conveyed to DBP. The trial court eventually dismissed the case against Quezon City but authorized the petitioners to recover the open space from MEI for donation to the city.
While the petitioners’ appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, MEI and DBP filed separate motions praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles. The Court of Appeals granted these motions, finding that the annotation was intended to harass the defendants and that the case had been unnecessarily prolonged by the plaintiffs. The petitioners then filed this certiorari action, arguing that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the cancellation.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens during the pendency of the appeal.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Court of Appeals’ resolution. The Court explained that a notice of lis pendens is a proper remedy in actions affecting title to or possession of real property, as it serves to warn prospective purchasers of pending litigation. However, such a notice is not an absolute right and can be cancelled by court order upon proper showing. Under Section 24 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, cancellation is warranted if the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party or if it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused its annotation.
The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the appellate court’s factual determination that the circumstances justified cancellation. The Court of Appeals had noted the prolonged nature of the case, partly due to repeated amendments by the plaintiffs, and concluded that the annotation was intended to harass MEI and DBP. This finding was not whimsical, arbitrary, or oppressive. The authority to cancel a notice of lis pendens is incidental to the court’s jurisdiction and can be exercised even before final judgment. Since the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals’ action was capricious or despotic, the extraordinary writ of certiorari could not be granted. The petition was dismissed.