G.R. No. L-60232-34 April 28, 1983
Eva Estrada-Kalaw and Ernesto Rondon, petitioners, vs. The Honorable Ricardo P. Tensuan, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch IV, Quezon City, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Eva Estrada-Kalaw was an accused in a criminal case before the Court of First Instance presided by respondent Judge Ricardo P. Tensuan. The Supreme Court had issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on November 23, 1982, directing the respondent judge to cease further proceedings in the criminal case pending resolution of a petition concerning the denial of Kalaw’s motion for a bill of particulars and motion to quash. Prior to this TRO, the lower court had issued an order on February 12, 1982, placing Kalaw under house arrest. Subsequently, the fiscal filed an urgent motion alleging Kalaw had violated this house arrest order and prayed for her confinement in jail.
Despite the pending TRO from the Supreme Court, respondent judge heard the fiscal’s motion and, on December 7, 1982, issued an order modifying the previous house arrest directive by confining Kalaw at the Fort Bonifacio Detention Center. Kalaw then filed motions in the Supreme Court, arguing the judge’s actions violated the TRO and seeking to have the judge and the implementing police colonel declared in contempt of court.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge violated the Supreme Court’s temporary restraining order by hearing the fiscal’s motion and subsequently modifying the house arrest order to confinement.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge did not violate the TRO. The Court clarified that the TRO was intended specifically to restrain the trial or further proceedings on the merits of Criminal Case No. Q-18959 to prevent the pending petition for certiorari and mandamus from becoming moot. It was not an absolute prohibition against all interlocutory actions by the trial court, especially those necessary to maintain the integrity of its own processes and jurisdiction.
The Court upheld the judge’s authority to modify the house arrest order under Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, which grants courts inherent power to amend and control their processes to conform to law and justice. The judge, based on uncontroverted evidence of Kalaw’s violations of the house arrest terms, was justified in amending the order to a stricter confinement to prevent potential flight and preserve the court’s authority. This modification was a procedural measure to uphold the court’s jurisdiction and did not touch upon the merits of the case covered by the TRO. The act was within the judge’s legal discretion to ensure compliance with court orders and was neither arbitrary nor illegal.
Regarding the contempt charge against the judge and police colonel, the Court found no basis. The judge acted within his powers, and the police colonel merely enforced a lawful order. Furthermore, the issue was rendered moot as the Solicitor General manifested that Kalaw had been released from detention due to a heart attack and transferred to a medical center. Consequently, the motion for contempt was noted.