GR 197164; (December, 2019) (Digest)
March 11, 2026GR 117056; (February, 1998) (Digest)
March 11, 2026G.R. No. L-5973 March 20, 1954
MARCELO VEA, petitioner, vs. CLAUDIO ACOBA and AGAPITA AGUSTIN, respondents
FACTS
Spouses Claudio Acoba and Agapita Agustin filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte against Marcelo Vea to restrain him from encroaching on their possession of a parcel of land, to be declared its owners, and to recover damages. Vea claimed ownership, having acquired the land from Esteban Ramoran on August 28, 1936, and asserted continuous possession since then. The lower court ruled for Vea, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the judgment in a prior case (Civil Case No. 240) binding on Vea, ordering him to return the property and pay for harvested palay. In Civil Case No. 240, Acoba and Agapita (as guardian of Felipa Ramos) sued Ramoran to recover the eastern third portion of land allotted to Felipa Ramos in a December 5, 1943 deed of partition executed by Ramoran, Felipa Ramos, and the Colcols. The court in that case declared the spouses owners and ordered Ramoran to deliver the land. On December 9, 1948, a writ of execution was issued, and the sheriff delivered the land to the spouses despite a third-party claim by Vea. On August 10, 1949, the spouses filed the present action (Civil Case No. 1089) against Vea. Vea established that he bought the land from Ramoran in 1936, and Ramoran had acquired it from Felipa Ramos through an absolute sale on November 11, 1935. Vea had been in possession since 1936 through his tenant Ramoran, paid taxes, and was unaware of the 1943 partition or Civil Case No. 240.
ISSUE
The core issue is the determination of ownership of the parcel of land, specifically whether the decision in Civil Case No. 240 is binding on Marcelo Vea as res judicata and whether Vea has a better right to the property.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that Marcelo Vea has a better right to the property. The deed of sale from Felipa Ramos to Esteban Ramoran on November 11, 1935, was an absolute sale, not an equitable mortgage. Thus, when Ramoran sold the land to Vea on August 28, 1936, Vea validly acquired ownership. Consequently, neither Ramoran nor Felipa Ramos had any title to the property when they executed the deed of partition on December 5, 1943. The lack of registration of Vea’s sale is immaterial as the property is not registered under the Land Registration Act, and Vea’s possession since 1936 strengthens his right. The decision in Civil Case No. 240 is not res judicata and not binding on Vea because he was not a party to that case, nor was he a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action; he became the owner in 1936, long before the case was filed. The case was dismissed without costs.
