GR L 59593; (September, 1983) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-59593, September 24, 1983
FRANCISCO B. ASUNCION, JR., Petitioner, v. HON. ROSALIO C. SEGUNDO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, and MAYOR LAUREANO S. PEREZ, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Francisco B. Asuncion, Jr. filed a special civil action for quo warranto against respondent Mayor Laureano S. Perez on July 15, 1981, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The suit contested the election of Mayor Perez on the ground of ineligibility. Private respondent Perez moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the action had prescribed. He pointed out that his proclamation occurred on February 1, 1980, and the governing law required the filing of such a quo warranto petition within ten days from proclamation.
The respondent Judge, Hon. Rosalio C. Segundo, issued an order on September 8, 1981, dismissing the case. The court held that the petition was filed out of time and, consequently, it lacked jurisdiction over the suit. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, prompting him to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court via a certiorari petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the quo warranto petition for having been filed beyond the prescriptive period.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the certiorari petition, affirming the order of dismissal. The ruling is anchored on the clear and mandatory prescription period for filing a quo warranto petition based on ineligibility under the Election Code. Section 189 of the 1978 Election Code explicitly grants a voter the right to file such a petition with the Commission on Elections within ten days after the proclamation of the election.
The legal logic is straightforward. The proclamation of respondent Perez was made on February 1, 1980. The ten-day period for filing commenced from this date. The petitioner, however, filed his action only on July 15, 1981, which was over a year later, far beyond the statutory deadline. The Court emphasized that when a statute speaks in clear and unequivocal language, there is no room for interpretation; it must be applied as written. The ten-day period is jurisdictional and must be strictly complied with. The distinction between an election protest and a quo warranto suit was noted, with the Court reiterating that a quo warranto action on the ground of ineligibility cannot be converted into an election protest. Since the petitioner failed to adhere to the inflexible ten-day rule, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent Judge.