G.R. No. L-59298. April 30, 1984.
FLORENTINA L. BACLAYON, petitioner, vs. HON. PACITO G. MUTIA, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Florentina L. Baclayon, a public school teacher, was convicted of Serious Oral Defamation for uttering insulting words against her school principal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, modifying the penalty to imprisonment. Upon promulgation of the sentence, Baclayon applied for probation. The Probation Officer’s Post-Sentence Investigation Report recommended granting probation for three years. However, respondent Judge Pacito G. Mutia, in his order granting probation, increased the probation period to five years and imposed several conditions. Among these was a special condition requiring Baclayon to “refrain from continuing her teaching profession.” Petitioner moved for the deletion of this condition, but the judge denied her plea, prompting this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing, as a condition for probation, that the petitioner refrain from continuing her teaching profession.

RULING

Yes, the imposition of the condition prohibiting the petitioner from teaching constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court clarified that conditions of probation under the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968) are classified as mandatory or discretionary. While trial courts have broad discretion to impose special conditions aimed at the rehabilitation of the probationer, such conditions must be realistic, purposive, and not unduly restrictive of lawful rights. The condition in question fails this test. Teaching is petitioner’s sole profession and lifetime calling, wherein she possesses special skills and has demonstrated excellence, even holding leadership roles. Forbidding her from teaching would effectively deprive her of the means to comply with the law’s requirement that a probationer devote herself to a lawful occupation. It would also unjustly deprive the school community of her expertise. Furthermore, the Court rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that the accessory penalty of suspension from profession automatically applied. Since probation was granted, the execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment was suspended, and consequently, the imposition of any accessory penalties was also suspended. The probation order is an interlocutory judgment, not a final sentence. Therefore, the contested condition is incompatible with the rehabilitative purpose of probation and unduly restrictive. The petition is granted, and paragraph (h) of the probation order is ordered deleted.