G.R. No. L-58671 November 22, 1985
Eduvigis J. Cruz, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a residential lot with improvements to her grandnieces through a deed entitled “Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala.” The property was transferred to the donees’ names. Subsequently, in 1974, Cruz judicially adopted a minor child, Cresencia Ocreto. Following the adoption, Cruz sought to revoke the donation extrajudicially, but the donees resisted.
The donees raised two primary defenses. First, they claimed the donated property was co-owned by Cruz and her late brother, Maximo Cruz, who was their grandfather, thus they already owned half by inheritance. Second, they asserted that Cruz owned another substantial agricultural property, so the donation did not impair the future legitime of the adopted child. Cruz then filed a formal complaint for revocation of donation in the Court of First Instance, invoking Article 760(3) of the Civil Code, which allows revocation if the donor subsequently adopts a minor child.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint for revocation of donation.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that the legal basis for revocation under Article 760 is not absolute but is qualified by Article 761. Article 761 provides that a donation may be revoked or reduced only insofar as it exceeds the freely disposable portion of the donor’s estate, considering the entire estate at the time of the child’s adoption. Therefore, the mere fact of adoption does not automatically revoke a prior donation; the donor-plaintiff must specifically allege and prove that the donation impairs the legitime of the subsequently adopted child.
In this case, petitioner Cruz failed to meet this burden. Her complaint contained no allegation that the donation impaired her adopted child’s legitime, nor did it provide any indication of her total assets to allow such an assessment. Conversely, unrebutted evidence showed she owned another valuable parcel of land, suggesting her estate likely remained sufficient. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals’ factual finding—that the donated lot was only half-owned by Cruz, with the other half belonging to her brother and thus to the donees by inheritance—reduced the actual value of the donation from her estate, making it even less likely to encroach upon the legitime. Since the petitioner did not fulfill the essential legal requirements to warrant revocation, the dismissal of her complaint was proper.