G.R. No. L-57892 September 21, 1982
Anastacio Arevalo and Pilar Silverio, petitioners, vs. Valentin Quilatan, et al., and The Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Anastacio Arevalo and Pilar Silverio sought the annulment of a judgment by default rendered against them in Civil Case No. 11045. The default judgment was based on substituted service of summons. The sheriff’s return stated that on August 2, 1968, copies of the summons and complaint were served upon the petitioners “thru their daughter-in-law, LUZ ESGUERES, a person with sufficient age and discretion residing therein,” at House No. 211 Pulang-lupa, Las Piñas, Rizal. The petitioners failed to answer, leading to the default judgment.
The petitioners filed an annulment case, contending the service was invalid. They asserted they no longer resided at No. 211 in August 1968 but had moved to and were dwelling at House No. 196 Pulang-lupa. They admitted owning No. 211, where their son and daughter-in-law Luz Esgueres lived, and that some of their belongings remained there. The pre-trial order limited the issue to whether the petitioners were duly served with summons in the original case.

ISSUE

Was the substituted service of summons at House No. 211 Pulang-lupa, Las Piñas, Rizal, valid, thereby vesting the trial court with jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners?

RULING

No, the substituted service was invalid. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s decision annulling the default judgment. The legal logic centers on the proper interpretation of “dwelling house or residence” under the Rules of Court for valid substituted service. The Court held that for substituted service to be effective under Section 8 of Rule 14, it must be made at the defendant’s “dwelling house or residence,” meaning the place where the defendant is habitually present and which they consider their permanent abode or home.
The petitioners’ positive testimony that they had moved to and were living at House No. 196 was not sufficiently rebutted. The fact that they owned House No. 211 and kept some belongings there did not legally establish it as their dwelling house for summons purposes. Ownership is distinct from residence. The daughter-in-law, Luz Esgueres, was not a person of suitable age and discretion residing in the petitioners’ dwelling house, as the petitioners themselves did not dwell there. The regularity of the sheriff’s return was thus overcome by clear evidence that the service was not made at the petitioners’ actual residence. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners in the original case, rendering the default judgment void. The case was remanded for trial on the merits to allow the petitioners their day in court.