G.R. No. L-57467 October 23, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRANCIS MILITANTE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH XII and ROSITA ABULE, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Rosita Abule was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XII, for issuing a check in July 1979 that was dishonored due to a closed account. Before her arraignment in this case, she filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy. She argued that a prior criminal case for Estafa, filed against her in April 1980 before Branch VII of the same court, was already pending and arose from the identical act of issuing the same dishonored check.
The prosecution opposed the motion, contending that double jeopardy did not apply because both cases were still pending trial and involved two distinct offenses defined and punished under different statutes. Respondent Judge Militante granted the motion and dismissed the BP Blg. 22 case, ruling that prosecuting the accused for this charge would violate her constitutional right against double jeopardy. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 case on the ground of double jeopardy was correct, given the pendency of the Estafa case based on the same act.

RULING

No, the dismissal was incorrect. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy requires the concurrence of specific requisites as outlined in Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. These are: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; (4) the accused has been convicted, acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without his express consent; and (5) the second offense is the same as the first, or is an attempt or frustration thereof, or one offense necessarily includes or is included in the other.
In this case, the essential requisites were not met. The accused had not yet pleaded to the charge in the BP Blg. 22 case. Furthermore, the earlier Estafa case was merely pending; it had not been terminated by a final judgment of conviction or acquittal, nor was it dismissed without the express consent of the accused. The prosecution had only rested its case in the Estafa proceedings. Since there was no prior conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of the first case, the plea of double jeopardy was premature and unavailing. The two pending prosecutions for different offenses arising from the same act do not constitute double jeopardy at this stage. The Orders of dismissal were set aside, and the trial court was ordered to proceed with the BP Blg. 22 case.