G.R. No. L-57259 October 13, 1983
ANGEL P. PERAN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH II, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SORSOGON, 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, RAMON ESPERA and ENCARNACION EVASCO, as private-respondents, respondents.

FACTS

The property in question is an unregistered residential land originally owned by Jose Evasco. In 1950, he executed an extrajudicial partition, allotting the lot to his son, Alejandro Evasco. Alejandro sold the land to Jose Torella in 1972, who later sold it to Jose Sabater in 1977. Petitioner Angel Peran finally purchased the property from Sabater in December 1978, with the sale recorded in the Register of Deeds. Private respondents, Encarnacion Evasco (a granddaughter of Jose Evasco) and Ramon Espera, have a house erected on a portion of this lot. In January 1979, petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the premises. Upon their refusal, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer before the Municipal Circuit Court on February 8, 1979.
The Municipal Circuit Court ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering respondents to vacate. On appeal, the Court of First Instance reversed the decision and dismissed the case. The appellate court held that the Municipal Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction because the one-year period to file an ejectment suit had prescribed. It reckoned the start of the period from the 1972 sale by Alejandro Evasco to Torella, not from petitioner’s 1979 demand. It further ruled that prior physical possession by respondents, in whatever character, was protected by law.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Court of First Instance erred in: (a) reckoning the one-year prescriptive period for filing the ejectment suit from the 1972 sale and not from the date of demand; and (b) ruling that prior possession in any character bars an ejectment action.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled for the petitioner and reinstated the Municipal Circuit Court’s decision. On the jurisdictional issue, the Court held that in an action for unlawful detainer, the one-year prescriptive period is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate. Demand is what makes the possession unlawful and triggers the cause of action. Petitioner’s personal demand was made in January 1979, and the complaint was filed in February 1979, well within the one-year period. The appellate court therefore erred in counting from the 1972 sale.
On the substantive issue, the Court clarified that while prior physical possession is generally protected in forcible entry cases, the rule differs for unlawful detainer involving possession by tolerance. Respondents’ possession was by mere tolerance of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest. Possession by tolerance is lawful initially but becomes illegal the moment the owner demands to vacate and the possessor refuses. A possessor by tolerance is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand. Against such a possessor, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy. The prior possession of respondents, being merely tolerated, did not vest a right they could assert against the true owner. The validity of the extrajudicial partition allotting the land to Alejandro Evasco, petitioner’s predecessor, was never challenged. Respondents failed to prove any right to possess the property.