G.R. No. L-56612 August 18, 1988
ELISEO B. YUSAY and AIDA O. YUSAY, Spouses, petitioners, vs. HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, as Presiding Judge, Branch II, CFI of ILOILO, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ILOILO and IGMEDIO SUMBANON, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Eliseo and Aida Yusay are the spouses against whom a writ of subsidiary execution was issued. The case originated from a criminal conviction. Rodolfo Guillen, the driver of a cargo truck, was convicted for reckless imprudence resulting in less serious physical injuries and damage to property after a collision with a truck owned by private respondent Igmedio Sumbanon. The respondent court, in its judgment, sentenced Guillen to imprisonment and ordered him to pay Sumbanon various damages totaling over P90,000. A writ of execution against Guillen was returned unsatisfied due to his insolvency.
Consequently, Sumbanon filed a motion for execution of the employer’s subsidiary civil liability against the petitioners, alleging Guillen was their employee. The respondent court granted the motion and issued the corresponding writ. The petitioners, after receiving the order, filed motions for reconsideration arguing against their subsidiary liability. These motions were denied, prompting the petitioners to file this certiorari petition to annul the orders and the writ, contending they were denied due process and that the subsidiary liability was improperly imposed.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of subsidiary execution against the petitioners-employers based solely on the criminal conviction of their employee, Rodolfo Guillen.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the settled doctrine of subsidiary liability under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court, reiterating the landmark case of Martinez v. Barredo, held that a final judgment of conviction against an employee, in the absence of collusion with the offended party, is conclusive and binding upon the employer in an action to enforce subsidiary civil liability. This is because the employer is deemed, in substance, a party to the criminal case, having a vital interest in its outcome since their liability is derivative and contingent upon the employee’s conviction and insolvency.
The employer’s recourse is to participate in the criminal case by assisting in the employee’s defense. Having failed to do so, and with the conviction having become final, the petitioners cannot later disclaim liability. The Court emphasized that the subsidiary liability arises automatically upon the employee’s conviction and a showing of his insolvency. The amount of civil liability is also conclusively determined by the criminal judgment. The petitioners’ claim of denial of due process is untenable, as the law itself makes the criminal case the proper venue for determining the facts giving rise to the subsidiary obligation. The employer is sufficiently protected by the opportunity to intervene in the defense during the criminal proceedings. Therefore, the issuance of the writ of execution was a ministerial duty of the court following the finality of the conviction and the return of the execution against the insolvent employee.