G.R. No. L-5640 May 29, 1953
ESTEBAN G. LAPID, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE HON. GUILLERMO CABRERA, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.

FACTS

On May 23, 1950, Ceferina Lawan filed a complaint for “Illegal Detention and Damages” against Esteban Lapid and Luciano Silla in the Municipal Court of Manila. The complaint alleged that Lawan was the owner of parcels of land in Tondo, Manila, and that the defendants were occupying a portion thereof (59.45 sq. m. at 2627 Rizal Avenue) without paying rent since March 11, 1947. The sheriff’s return certified that summons and the complaint were served on May 26, 1950, “upon Esteban Lapid and Luciano Silla… through Luciano Silla personally.” On May 30, 1950, Judge Guillermo Cabrera rendered a decision by default against Lapid, ordering him to vacate the premises and pay monthly compensation. On June 6, 1950, Lapid, through counsel, filed a motion for a new trial under Rule 38, alleging fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Lawan opposed the motion and prayed for immediate execution. On June 8, 1950, the court denied Lapid’s motion and granted execution. On June 9, 1950, an ejectment writ was issued. Lapid then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Manila, challenging the Municipal Court’s decision and execution order, arguing lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons (claiming he resided at 2558 Rizal Avenue Extension, not 2627 Rizal Avenue). The CFI granted the petition, declaring the decision and execution order null and void. The respondents appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for certiorari filed by Esteban Lapid in the Court of First Instance was the proper remedy to assail the Municipal Court’s denial of his motion for new trial and the subsequent execution of the judgment.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance. The Court held that the proper remedy for Lapid was to appeal the order denying his motion for a new trial filed under Rule 38 (not the judgment itself) to the corresponding appellate court. By failing to appeal that denial order, the Municipal Court’s judgment became final and executory. Consequently, the issuance of the writ of execution was proper. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari was inappropriate as there was an available, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which was an appeal. The decision appealed from was revoked, with costs against the petitioner-appellee, Esteban G. Lapid.