G.R. No. L-56135, September 29, 1983
Spouses Ricardo and Lourdes Cortez, Petitioners, v. Judge Serafin E. Camilon, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch VIII and Recaredo Coronel, Respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners, Spouses Cortez, were tenants in a Makati apartment owned by respondent Recaredo Coronel under a month-to-month lease. Coronel sought to eject them, alleging he needed the apartment for the use of his daughter, Grace Coronel-Valdez, who was residing with her in-laws. The Makati municipal court ordered the spouses’ ejectment, a decision affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The Cortez spouses appealed, contending that the ground for ejectment based on the lessor’s need for the property for use by an immediate family member, as specified under Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, applies only when the lease contract is for a definite period and that period has expired. They argued that their month-to-month lease, having no fixed term, did not expire and was covered by the suspension of ejectment under Article 1673(1) of the Civil Code as per Presidential Decree No. 20 and BP 25.

ISSUE

Whether the lessor can judicially eject tenants under a month-to-month lease on the ground of personal need for an immediate family member, notwithstanding the statutory suspension of ejectment based on the mere expiration of the lease period.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decision, ruling in favor of the lessor. The legal logic centers on distinguishing between the ground for ejectment and the procedural condition of lease expiration. Presidential Decree No. 20 and subsequently Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 suspended the application of Article 1673(1) of the Civil Code, which allows ejectment upon the expiration of the lease period, for residential units within certain rental ceilings. This suspension, however, applies specifically to that particular ground (expiration of term) and not to other independent grounds for ejectment established by law.
BP 25, which was governing at the time, explicitly provided a new and separate ground for ejectment under Section 5(c): the need of the owner to repossess the property for personal use or for an immediate family member, provided certain conditions (like notice and a one-year occupancy) are met. The Court clarified that the requirement in Section 5(c) that “the period of lease has expired” is a condition applicable to leases with a definite term. For month-to-month leases or those with no fixed period, the lease is terminable at the will of either party under Article 1687 of the Civil Code. The lessor validly terminated the lease contract through a demand to vacate. The subsequent ejectment suit was not based on the expired lease period (a suspended ground) but on the distinct and legitimate ground of personal need under BP 25. Therefore, the suspension of Article 1673(1) did not bar the ejectment.