G.R. No. L-6501
BEHN, MEYER & CO., LIMITED, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
November 25, 1910

FACTS:
Behn, Meyer & Co. Limited (Behn, Meyer) imported glass tumblers, which the Collector of Customs at Cebu classified under paragraph 13(a) of the tariff law as “common ordinary glass imitating crystal in tumblers, cut,” subject to a duty of $12 per 100 ko., or 30% ad valorem.

Behn, Meyer filed a protest, arguing that the tumblers were made of ordinary glass, did not imitate crystal, and were not cut (the bottom was only roughly ground to stand level). They claimed the tumblers should be classified under paragraph 12 as “common ordinary hollow glassware,” at $0.80 per 100 ko., or 20% ad valorem. The Cebu Collector overruled the protest, noting his personal disagreement with the 13(a) classification but following instructions.

Behn, Meyer appealed to the Insular Collector of Customs, reiterating their claim for classification under paragraph 12 and explicitly stating the tumblers were not crystal or imitating crystal. The Insular Collector sustained the Cebu Collector’s decision, noting that while the tumblers were not “cut” and might fall under paragraph 13(b) (crystal or glass imitating crystal, not cut), the protest only claimed classification under paragraph 12. “In the absence of a correct claim,” the decision stood.

Behn, Meyer then appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. In this appeal, they expanded their protest, claiming the tumblers should be classified under paragraph 13(b) (tumblers not cut) or, alternatively, under paragraph 12 (common ordinary hollow glassware). The CFI ruled that the merchandise should have been classified under paragraph 13(b) and ordered reliquidation.

The Insular Collector of Customs appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that an importer cannot change the basis of their protest on appeal to the CFI if the new claim was not made within the statutory period of five days from payment of duties.

ISSUE:
Can an importer change or expand the grounds of their protest on appeal to the Court of First Instance to claim classification under a different tariff paragraph, especially when that new claim was not distinctly and specifically raised in the original protest filed with the Collector of Customs within the statutory period?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CFI and affirmed the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs.

The Court held that the rights of the importer (appellee) are determined entirely by the protest first made. Objections not distinctly and specifically set forth in the initial protest cannot be raised afterward. The law requires the protester to disclose the grounds of their protest at the time of making it for two purposes: (1) to apprise the collector of the objections before it is too late to remove them, and (2) to hold the importer to the objections on which they truly acted.

In this case, Behn, Meyer’s original protest explicitly claimed classification under paragraph 12 and, by its description of the goods (not cut, not imitating crystal), effectively excluded classification under both subdivisions of paragraph 13 (a or b). The claim for classification under paragraph 13(b) was only raised for the first time during the appeal to the CFI, which was beyond the statutory period for filing protests. The Court cannot grant relief for a correct classification if it was not claimed in the protest, even if the merits are apparent and injustice may result. The Court’s role is to pass upon the correctness of the allegations of the protest, not to independently find a new classification outside the specified grounds of the original protest.

Since Behn, Meyer’s original protest specifically pointed to paragraph 12 and excluded paragraph 13, the CFI erred in ordering classification under paragraph 13(b) when that ground was not timely raised.