G.R. No. L-56; October 10, 1945
MAURICIO MIRANO, petitioner, vs. POMPEYO DIAZ, Judge of First Instance of Manila, et al., respondents.

FACTS

On June 11, 1945, respondents Pedro Mossesgeld Santiago and Mercedes Alonzo Mossesgeld filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against petitioner Mauricio Mirano in the Municipal Court of Manila. They alleged that on May 7, 1945, Mirano illegally deprived them of possession of a lot and house by means of force and intimidation. Mirano, as defendant, moved to dismiss the case, contending that the alleged sale of the property to the respondents was null and void due to a forged power of attorney executed under duress, thereby raising an issue of ownership. The municipal judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the question involved was one of ownership, not possession. The respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. That court, upon the respondents’ motion asserting that the case involved possession and not ownership, held that the municipal court had jurisdiction and remanded the case for trial on the merits. Mirano attempted to appeal this remand order, but the Court of First Instance judge (respondent Pompeyo Diaz) disapproved his record on appeal, deeming the order interlocutory and unappealable. Mirano then filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the remand order and prohibit the municipal judge from further proceeding with the case.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order remanding the forcible entry and detainer case to the municipal court for trial on the merits.

RULING

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court held that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance acted strictly in accordance with law. The established doctrine is that in a forcible entry and detainer case where the inferior court dismisses it for lack of jurisdiction and an appeal is taken, the Court of First Instance’s only task is to determine whether the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case on the merits. If it finds that jurisdiction exists, it must remand the case for trial. The order of remand was therefore correct. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, it must be shown that the judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, which was not demonstrated here. The petition was devoid of merit.
Separate Concurring Opinion (Justice Perfecto):
Justice Perfecto concurred in the result but disagreed with the characterization of the remand order as interlocutory. He opined that the order finally disposed of the appeal on the jurisdictional issue and would have been appealable. However, since the petitioner chose to raise the jurisdictional question directly via certiorari, and because the allegations of the complaint (forcible deprivation of possession on May 7, 1945) properly invoked the municipal court’s jurisdiction to protect possession and preserve public peace, the petition must be denied.