G.R. No. L-552, November 17, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. UI MATIAO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The defendant, Ui Matiao, was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila for the offense of an attempt to bribe a public official. The conviction was based on Articles 381 and 387 of the Penal Code, in relation to Article 354. The defendant was sentenced to six months and one day of imprisonment and a fine of three times the amount of the alleged bribe.

The charge stemmed from an incident where Ui Matiao, who had applied for a license to sell oil, offered a note for ten pesos to Dr. Altman, a sanitary inspector. Dr. Altman’s duty was to inspect the premises and report on the license application. To secure evidence, Dr. Altman had Ui Matiao sign a note stating he offered ten pesos to expedite his license. The defendant demurred to the complaint, arguing that the facts charged did not constitute an offense.

ISSUE:
Whether the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the crime of bribery or an attempt to bribe a public official under the relevant provisions of the Penal Code.

RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case. The Court held that for a public official to be convicted of bribery under Article 381, he must have accepted a bribe for committing, in the discharge of his duties, an act constituting a crime. The penalty for the bribe-giver under Article 387 is the same as that for the official suborned.

The Court found the complaint insufficient because it failed to allege a crucial element: that the act the official was bribed to perform (i.e., making a favorable report) would itself constitute a crime. Specifically, under Article 354, the official’s act must be an “unjust” decision “knowingly rendered.” The complaint contained no allegation that Dr. Altman’s report, if made favorably in consideration of the bribe, would have been an unjust decision rendered knowingly. Without this essential element, the facts charged did not properly constitute the offense defined by the cited articles.

The Court noted that the charge might possibly fall under other articles (e.g., Article 386, concerning officials accepting gifts by reason of their office), but the penalties prescribed there differ and are not applicable under the theory of the prosecution. Due to the insufficiency of the information, the conviction could not stand.